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Reexamining the Act of State Doctrine:
An Integrated Conflicts Analysis
Gregory H. Fox*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court does not often decide cases on the status of
international law in United States courts. Instead, such issues generally
have been played out in the lower federal courts and the pages of
academic journals. No issue has suffered more from the lack of Supreme
Court precedent than the act of state doctrine, a judge-made prudential
rule that prevents United States courts from sitting in judgment on
the official acts of foreign sovereigns. Consequently, when the Supreme
Court issued a unanimous opinion dealing with the act of state doctrine
in W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics, Inc.,' international law-
yers, long confounded by the doctrine's complexity, had reason to
hope for definitive guidance.
Unfortunately, this guidance was not forthcoming. In a short, curt
opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that act of state functions as
a special "rule of decision," requiring courts faced with challenges to
the official acts of sovereign governments to apply the law of the
foreign state as the rule of decision. Further, the Court held, the
government's acts must be presumed valid under that law. 2 This
Article is an attempt to understand what this holding means in cases
where the foreign government is alleged to have violated international
law. I will argue that, after Kirkpatrick, the act of state doctrine cannot
be understood in any coherent fashion. Framing act of state as a
"special" choice of law rule cannot be squared with the normal choice
of law analysis a court would perform in the absence of the doctrine.
The choice of law approach assumes that the public policy of the
forum, a component of most conflicts analyses, means one thing in
the normal analysis and another at the act of state stage. Moreover,
the choice of law framework appears to contradict those exceptions to
* Senior Fellow, Center for International Studies, New York University Law School; Mac-
Arthur Foundation/Social Science Research Council Fellow in International Peace and Security.
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1. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
2. Id. at 705, 707.
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the doctrine which are precisely concerned with state acts in violation
of international law.
Kirkpatrick is especially disturbing given recent trends in human
rights litigation. Since the Second Circuit's ground-breaking 1980
decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,3 the most dynamic adjudication of
international law in U.S. courts has occurred under the alien tort
statute, a little-used provision of the First Judiciary Act of 1789.
4
Filartiga establishes that the alien tort statute permits citizens of
foreign states to bring claims in U.S. courts against officials of their
national governments for violations of fundamental human rights. In
establishing the alien tort statute as a vehicle for human rights liti-
gation, Filartiga and its progeny promise to make good on Justice
Powell's observation, made in the 1971 case of First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, that "[u]ntil international tribunals
command a wider constituency, the courts of the various countries
afford the best means for the development of a respected body of
international law."
However, sustaining subject-matter jurisdiction under the statute
is only the first step in realizing this vision. Courts must next confront
the question of which law applies to the merits of human rights
claims; it is at this point that the act of state doctrine is raised as a
defense and that the confusion of Kirkpatrick threatens to eclipse the
clear role accorded international law at the jurisdictional stage. If act
of state defenses succeed in alien tort cases, and international law is
not selected as the rule of decision, Justice Powell's vision will indeed
have failed. For here we have a statute explicitly requiring a violation
of international law as a jurisdictional prerequisite. If the choice of
law theory used by federal courts in such cases cannot surmount
Kirkpatrick and choose international law, there is little chance courts
will do so when their jurisdictional base makes no mention of that
law.
Filartiga-type alien tort claims, then, are the crucial measure of
Kirkpatrick's impact on the influence of international law in U.S.
courts. This Article first attempts to understand Kirkpatrick itself. Part
II explains the ambiguities in act of state law which existed prior to
Kirkpatrick and which that case attempted to ameliorate. Parts III and
IV explore the choice of law analysis which Kirkpatrick assumes would
3. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Star. 73, 77, codifiedat 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
The statute provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."
5. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1971) (Citi-
bank") (Powell, J., concurring).
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precede invocation of the act of state doctrine. Here, the contradictions
of the holding become apparent. In light of these problems, I propose
in Part V that the policies represented by act of state and its relevant
exceptions be freed of the cumbersome Kirkpatrick framework and
recast in a comprehensive choice of law analysis. As when formulating
any rule of federal common law, the first goal of this analysis should
be to give effect to relevant federal policies. In Part VII return to the
alien tort statute and conclude that its authors in the first Congress
intended for international law to serve as the rule of decision in actions
under the statute. Unhindered by the Kirkpatrick framework it is clear
that this congressional intent must control any act of state analysis.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE PRIOR TO KIRKPATRICK
Before analyzing the Kirkpatrick decision, it is necessary to under-
stand three crucial areas of the act of state doctrine which courts have
left unclear. Relevant precedent has never definitively enumerated what
policies justify the doctrine, explained how the doctrine functions, or
identified the possible exceptions to the doctrine.
A. Policies Justifying the Doctrine
1. Act of State as Originally Conceived
The act of state doctrine first surfaced in the late nineteenth century
during the reign of positivism and its territorial conception of judicial
power. 6 During this era, rights were believed to derive largely from
the prerogatives and power of the sovereign. 7 Coupled with the West-
phalian conception of inherent state equality,8 positivism placed a
territorial limit on the enforcement of laws. As Professor Beale-an
enthusiastic positivist and Reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflict
of Laws--claimed: "Within his own territory the jurisdiction of the
sovereign is exclusive . . . .On the other hand, a sovereign has in
general no power or jurisdiction outside his own territory; and he can
confer upon his legislature no greater power than he himself
possesses." 9
The inherent equality of states circumscribed the reach of interna-
tional law. Rules of conduct were "based on the common consent of
individual states" and so governed only disputes between and among
6. See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of
Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REv. 397, 404-12 (1987).
7. EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 94-95 (rev. ed. 1974).
8. For a comprehensive discussion of the Westphalian legal order, see Leo Gross, The Peace
of Wesiphalia: 1648-1948, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948).
9. Joseph H. Beale, Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. Rav. 241, 245 (1923).
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states. 10 An ironclad conception of sovereignty, arising out of the
delicate balance of power among the competing European states, meant
that no authority could gainsay the right of nation-states to structure
their societies as they saw fit." While the government of an individual
suffering injury at the hands of a foreign state official might assert a
claim for compensation on the individual's behalf, 12 if an individual
was injured by an official of his own government he had no remedy
under international law. 13
Underhill v. Hernandez,14 the Supreme Court's first significant act of
state decision, reflected the legal theories of the positivist era. 5 In
Underhill, a U.S. citizen claimed that he had been detained against
his will by a Venezuelan general and forced to perform hard labor. 16
Chief Justice Fuller affirmed the dismissal of Underhill's claims, ex-
plaining (in what is arguably dicta):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves. 17
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases, arising out of expropriations
by the Mexican revolutionary government, restated Underhill's concern
10. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 19 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955).
11. THOMiASJ. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 115 (1895); MORTON
A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 94-99 (1961).
12. United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875) ("a citizen of one nation wronged
by the conduct of another nation, must seek redress through his own government.").
13. Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OP
Hui iAN RIGHTS 23-136 (1973); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
Over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-lre/a, 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 65 (1981). Professor Sohn has identified several older examples of
international protection provided to persons suffering domestic persecution. The examples,
however, were exceptions to the general rule respecting the rights of sovereignty within territorial
bounds. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States,
32 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1982).
14. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The most detailed discussion of the facts in Underhill appears in
the lower court opinion. Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1897).
15. Although its positivist underpinnings have long been discredited, and its precedential
value eroded by four recent Supreme Court decisions, Underhill is still cited and quoted in
virtually every act of state decision. In the Sabbatino case, Justice Harlan referred to Underhill
as the "classic American statement of the act of state doctrine." Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964). This sentence echoes throughout the subsequent case
law.
16. 65 F. 577 (2d Cit. 1895) at 578.
17. 168 U.S. at 252.
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with maintaining comity between nations. In Ricaud v. American Metal
Company' the Court reworked Underhill into a more familiar choice
of law analysis and held that "the acts of another [nation] done within
its own territory . . . must be accepted by our courts as a rule for
their decision."'19 In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 20 the Court described
this rule as resting "at last upon the highest considerations of inter-
national comity and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of
one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the
courts of another would certainly 'imperil the amicable relations be-
tween governments and vex the peace -of nations.' "21 In sum, the
Court's decisions during the positivist era conferred on sovereign acts
a conclusive presumption of validity. Like the notion of vested rights
in positivist thinking, this presumption retained its force regardless
of the forum in which the sovereign act was challenged. 22
2. The Doctrine as Modified by Sabbatino and Its Progeny: From
External Deference to Internal Deference
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino23 the Supreme Court all but
disclaimed its reasoning in Underhill. The Sabbatino Court's act of state
inquiry turned not on whether upholding the plaintiff's claim would
infringe the sovereignty of other nations but on whether the Court
would encroach upon Executive Branch prerogatives in foreign policy-
making. 24 Sabbatino arose out of the nationalization of a Cuban cor-
poration, owned by U.S. citizens, in the wake of President Eisenhow-
er's restriction of Cuban sugar imports. 25 The district court found the
nationalization decree to be both retaliatory and discriminatory, and
consequently a violation of established international norms. Such il-
18. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
19. Id. at 309.
20. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
21. Id. at 304.
22. Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (Holmes, J.) ("[b]ut
as the only source of this [legal] obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that law
determines not merely the existence of the obligation but equally determines its extent" [citation
omitted]) See also EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFUCT OF LAWS 13-14 (1982) (dis-
cussing vested-rights theory).
23. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
24. Sabbatino's departure from Underhill is obscured somewhat by Justice Harlan's statement
that "[n]one of this Court's subsequent cases in which the act of state doctrine was directly or
peripherally involved manifest any retreat from Underhill." Id. This passage, however, can be
read as merely descriptive of Oetjen, Ricaud, and other early cases which are cited immediately
following the quoted sentence, and not as normative. Harlan, in fact, describes the doctrine
several pages later as nor being "compelled . . . by the inherent nature of sovereign authority,
as some of the earlier decisions seem to imply, see Underhill, supra; American Banana, supra;
Oetjen, supra." Id. at 421.
25. Id. at 401.
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legal acts, it held, were not subject to the act of state doctrine. 26 The
Second Circuit affirmed but based its ruling on a different theory-
the so-called" Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine. 27 Benstein
provides that when the Executive Branch gives assurances that a
lawsuit challenging an act of state will not interfere with the nation's
foreign policy, the doctrine will not bar further adjudication. 28
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the act of state doctrine
was compelled neither by international law29 nor by gratuitous gestures
of comity on the part of the United States. 30 Rather, the Court
described the doctrine as having "constitutional underpinnings" that
called into question "the competency of dissimilar institutions to make
and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
relations." 31 This new rationale required courts to look not outward
but inward. Courts were to invoke the doctrine to ensure "the proper
distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches
of the Government on matters bearing on foreign affairs." 32 The act
of state doctrine, the Court held, expressed "the strong sense of the
judicial branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this
country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of
nations as a whole in the international sphere." 33
A judicial pronouncement that the Cuban expropriation decree
violated international law would constitute just such a hindrance.
26. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
27. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1962).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 74-76. The court based its ruling on two letters from
the Office of the Legal Adviser to the State Department which it read to give such assurances.
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 858-59.
29. 376 U.S. at 421.
30. Id. ("While historic notions of sovereign authority do bear upon the wisdom ofernploying
the act of state doctrine, they do not dictate its existence.") See alo Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleun Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3rd Cir. 1979) (noting the Court's recent "shift in
focus from the notions of sovereignty and the dignity of independent nations").
31. 376 U.S. at 423. Justice Harlan's opinion can be read as recognizing that to base act of
state even on a flexible comity rationale-one that attempted to gauge the degree of offense to
a foreign government on a case-by-case basis-would lead a court to make the very sort of
political judgments that the doctrine was designed to avoid. A court in such an instance would
need to assess the state of relations between the United States and the foreign government, make
predictions based on past behavior, and judge whether each nation's policy on the subject matter
of the lawsuit should be measured by its written laws or by its course of conduct.
32. Id. at 427-28. Note that Harlan does not refer to the relationship between the Judiciary
and the Executive Branch but rather the Judiciary and the "political branches of the Government."
Harlan clearly has both the Executive and the Legislative Branches in mind here, implying that
judicial conflict with a stated congressional policy on foreign affairs might compromise separation
of the branches just as would a conflict with the Executive. A claimant under the Alien Tort
Statute might use this passage as a basis for arguing that judicial use of the act of state doctrine
to dismiss a claim brought under the statute would contravene a Congressional policy, manifest
in the statute itself, to allow the claimant's class of plaintiffs a judicial remedy.
33. Id. at 423.
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Justice Harlan reviewed international opinion on the legality of con-
fiscatory expropriations and found "few if any issues in international
law today on which opinion seems to be so divided. 3 4 In this circum-
stance, he held, negotiation by the Executive Branch rather than
"piecemeal dispositions" through litigation would best serve the na-
tion's foreign policy interests. 35
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Sabbatino and its retreat from terri-
torial positivism in two subsequent decisions. In First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba36 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
himself and Justices Burger and White, held that the act of state
doctrine rested "primarily on the basis that juridical review of acts of
state of a foreign power could embarrass the conduct of foreign rela-
tions by the political branches of the government" and urged adoption
of the Bernstein exception.
37
In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba38 the Court continued its
departure from the comity rationale:
The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy
of foreclosing court adjudications involving the legality of acts of
foreign states on their own soil that might embarrass the Executive
Branch of our Government in the conduct of our foreign
relations. 39
In Dunhill the Court also made its first comprehensive effort to
define which acts are "sovereign" and thus amenable to the act of state
doctrine. It held that a sovereign act is "the public act of those with
authority to exercise sovereign powers and . . . entitled to respect
before our courts." 40 A four justice plurality declined to apply the act
of state doctrine "to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course
of their purely commercial operations."
41
3. Implications of the Sabbatino Reformulation
If the Court has now replaced the comity rationale with separation
of powers concerns, we might expect act of state decisions to follow
34. Id. at 428.
35. Id. at 432.
36. 406 U.S. 759 (1971).
37. Id. at 765. For a discussion of the Bermtein exception, see infra notes 74-76 and
accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist also described the doctrine's "roots" as lying "in the
notion of comity between independent nations." Citibank, 406 U.S. at 765. Yet, as support for
the passage quoted in the text announcing a separation of powers rationale, he cited Underhill
and Oetjen.
38. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
39. Id. at 697.
40. Id. at 694.
41. Id. at 706, 695.
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one of two paths. First, a court could undertake its own investigation
into how a judgment against a foreign official might affect U.S. policy
toward the official's government. If the court concluded that little
interference was likely then it would find the doctrine inapplicable. 42
In Sabbatino, for example, the Court remarked that the doctrine would
be of little relevance if the government in question were no longer in
power. 43 Second, a court might solicit an opinion on a case directly
from the Executive Branch. Presumably, the court would then give
dispositive weight to a statement that the case should not go forward.
This option in essence describes the Bernstein exception.
Only Justice Powell, in his Citibank concurrence, has followed the
first route and made an independent judgment as to how a finding of
liability would affect foreign policy. 44 The full Court has never adopted
the Bernstein rationale either, and when a three justice plurality at-
tempted to do so in the Citibank case, each of the concurring and
dissenting justices disagreed. 45 Justice Douglas remarked that defer-
ring to an executive opinion would render the Court "a mere errand
boy for the Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people's
chestnuts from the fire, but not others'." 46 It is unclear, therefore,
how courts are expected to gauge (1) the degree of interference caused
by a finding of liability; and (2) whether any given level of interference
is sufficient to justify invoking the act of state doctrine.
B. How the Doctrine Functions
Pre-Kirkpatrick cases provided two separate explanations for how the
act of state doctrine actually functioned. The doctrine served either as
a form of abstention or as a choice of law rule. 47 The abstention view
is implicit in Underhill's declaration that U.S. courts "will not sit in
judgment" on the acts of foreign sovereigns. Such a refusal to entertain
a claim, regardless of the law applied to review it, implies that a
42. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 ("the less important the implications of an issue are for our
foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.").
43. Id.
44. 406 U.S. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 777 (Brennan,
J., joined by Stewart, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring).
47. Joseph Dellapenna, in a recent and comprehensive survey of the doctrine, argues that the
doctrine functions as a rule of repose:
Rather than requiring or permitting a court to refuse to hear a case, the doctrine actually
functions as a rule of special deference to specific exertions of state power similar in effect
to a judgment by a court in that the state decision (an "act" if you will) precludes fresh
inquiry into issues decided by that decision.
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine, 35 ViaI. L. REv. 1, 46 (1990).
Because Dellapenna'a theory is decidedly a minority position, I do not consider it further in this
brief discussion.
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category of cases are removed from judicial competence. A variation
of this view is Justice Brennan's argument that challenges to foreign
acts of state should be treated as political questions under Baker v.
Carr.4 Joseph Dellapenna points to two aspects of the doctrine which
support the abstention view.49 First, cases following Underhill often
use phrases such as "refrain from examining" or "refrain from sitting
in judgment" which suggest that courts are not competent to hear a
class of cases. Dellapenna's second point is that dismissal on act of
state grounds usually occurs without a discussion of the merits or a
stipulation that further proceedings in third countries are thereby
barred. Both suggest that the court has refused to consider the case
from the very outset.50
The choice of law view adopted by Kirkpatrick appeared briefly in
earlier Supreme Court decisions but was never explained in detail. 51
The most explicit foreshadowing appeared in Ricaud, where the Court
held that seizure of property by the revolutionary Mexican government
"must be accepted by courts as a rule for their decision." 52 It remanded
the case for a determination of title to the property according to "the
result of the action taken by the military government in Mexico." 53
In a statement which could be taken as a repudiation of the abstention
view, the Court described its actions as "not a surrender or abandon-
ment of jurisdiction but . . . an exercise of it." 54 The choice of law
view, therefore, contemplated a judgment on the merits which is
presumably both preclusive in effect and enforceable where valid. 55
The abstention and choice of law theories, exceptions aside, imply
quite different views of how international law functions in U.S. courts.
48. 369 U.S. 186, 210-12 (1962); see Citibank, 406 U.S. at 787-89 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); see also id. at 776 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. Dellapenna, supra note 47, at 32-34.
50. For cases expressing the abstention view, see Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697; Citibank, 406
U.S. at 775-76 (Powell, J., concurring); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344,
357-60 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Reidel v. Bancam, 792 F.2d 587,
592 (6th Cir. 1986); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985); Ramirez-
Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1533-34 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds,
471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F. 2d 1354, 1358-59 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleun Corp., 595
F.2d 1287, 1292 (3rd Cir. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Co., 550 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). See also Richard Lillich, A Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square: The
Second Circuit and Sabbatino, 8 VILL. L. Rav. 155, 156 (1963) (describing the doctrine as a
"principle of judicial self-restraint and deference to the role of the executive or political branch
of the government in the field of foreign affairs" (quoting COMnrEE ON THE JURIDICAL AspEcTs
OF NATIONALIZATION AND FOREIGN PROPERTY, AMERICAN BRANCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASsOCIATION, REPORT ON THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 3 (Brussels Conference, 1962)).
51. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 705 n.18; Citibank, 406 U.S. at 763; Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 418,
438.
52. Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 309.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Dellapenna, supra note 47, at 45.
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The abstention view assumes that an act of state dismissal is not a
judgment on the merits. 56 In cases where a plaintiff alleges a violation
of an international norm, a court which abstains expresses no view on
the status of the norm in the hierarchy of available rules of decision.
It holds simply that our courts are not the appropriate fora in which
to challenge the acts of coequal sovereigns. The choice of law view,
by contrast, not only rejects international law as an appropriate rule
of decision (thus suggesting that forum policy elevates other consid-
erations above fidelity to international norms) but also permits the
U.S. judicial system to be used as a means of enforcing an act which
violates international law. 57
C. Exceptions to the Doctrine
Several exceptions to the doctrine purport to give effect to principles
of international law. The Supreme Court first referred to these excep-
tions in Sabbatino, perhaps because this was the first act of state decision
involving violations of international law. The Court has never based a
decision squarely upon an act of state exception, although the excep-
tions appear frequently in lower court decisions and are often cham-
pioned by academic commentators. By and large the exceptions permit
courts to discard the predictable but often unpalatable results of
Underhill's rigid territoriality. For alien tort plaintiffs the exceptions
are perhaps the only way of avoiding a dismissal on act of state
grounds.58
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443
cmt. f (1987) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS"]:
[tihe fact that pursuant to the act of state doctrine the validity of an act of a foreign state
was not examined and was given effect by a court in the United States is not dispositive
in proceedings brought elsewhere as to the validity of the act either under international
law or under applicable municipal law.
Neither the text of the Restatement nor its official comments explicitly adopt the abstention view,
although it would seem to follow logically from the quoted passage. The Reporters' Notes adopt
the choice of law view, although this is certainly a reflection of the views of the Chief Reporter,
Louis Henkin. See id. Reporters' Note 1.
57. Malvina Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurreaed: The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement
of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 68, 85-87 (1985) (arguing that act of state
functions to implement another state's illegal act and is itself a violation of international law).
58. Act of state has become a favorite defense of alien tort defendants because of the appealing
paradox it presents in such cases: the very pleading criteria necessary to support jurisdiction in
a Filartiga-type action-an act of a foreign official committed in the course of his regular
duties--also triggers application of the act of state doctrine. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp.
1531, 1546 (N.D.Ca. 1987) (Forti 1) ("since violations of the law of nations virtually all involve
acts practiced, encouraged or condoned by states, defendant's argument [for applying act of
state) would in effect preclude litigation under § 1350 for 'tortfs] . . . committed in violation
of the law of nations."' (citing Filartiga, 577 F.Supp. 860, 862)); see Blum & Steinhardt, supra
note 13, at 108; Michael C. Small, Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal
Courts: The Alien Tort Statute and Separation of Powers, 74 GEo. L.J. 163, 185 (1985).
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1. The Consensus Exception
Under the consensus exception, act of state is inapplicable where
the plaintiff alleges violation of a norm supported by broad agreement
in the international community. According to the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations:
A claim arising out of an alleged violation of fundamental human
rights-for instance, a claim on behalf of a victim of torture or
genocide-would (if otherwise actionable) probably not be de-
feated by the act of state doctrine, since the accepted international
law of human rights is well established and contemplates external
scrutiny of such acts.59
This exception derives from Sabbatino's attempt to avoid an "inflexible
and all-encompassing" approach to act of state. 60 Justice Harlan iden-
tified the institutional competence of courts to pass on issues affecting
foreign policy as one important variable in the determination of
whether to apply the act of state doctrine. 61 Judicial expertise is at its
lowest ebb (and, consequently, the executive's at its highest) where
the international community and the United States are not in accord
on a particular rule. Conversely, the Judiciary is most suited to ad-
judicate a claim based on an uncontroversial rule:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codi/kation or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions re-
garding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of
an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
national interest or with international justice. 62
The consensus exception offers special appeal in alien tort actions.
To sustain jurisdiction under the statute a plaintiff must invoke a
well-established international rule condemning the defendant's con-
duct. 63 If such unanimity in the international community is sufficient
to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, it would also seem sufficient
to serve as the consensus required by the Restatement (Third) and
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, sUpra note 56, § 443 cmt. c.
60. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
61. Id. at 423.
62. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
63. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (norm in question must "command the general assent of
civilized nations").
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Sabbatino.64 Thus, the district court on remand in Filartiga rejected
an act of state defense, explaining that human rights law is "clear and
uncontroversial." 65 An alien tort plaintiff who survived the jurisdic-
tional hurdle would seem certain to prevail. 66
64. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 109 ("[o]nce the court determines that the § 1350
tort is in violation of the law of nations and thus sustains subject matter jurisdiction, the
interests served by non-review on the basis of the act of state doctrine correspondingly
diminish.").
65. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Additional case law on
the consensus exception is scarce. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1433 (9th
Cir. 1989) (international consensus condemning murder militates against invoking act of state),
cert. dism'd, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3863 (1990); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649
F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981) (no international consensus condemning conspiracies in restraint
of trade; exception held inapplicable), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The consensus
exception, however, is frequently favored by commentators. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The
Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 491
n. 133 (1989); Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 108-9; Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The
Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply "Historical Trivia"?, 21 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 355 (1988); Ronald G. Haron, Recent Development, 27 VA. J. INT'L
L. 433, 440-41 (1987); Small, supra note 58, at 188; Laura Wishik, Recent Development,
Separation of Powers and Adjudication of Human Rights Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 60
WASH. L. REV. 697, 704-05 (1985).
66. The consensus exception becomes significantly more complex if Justice Harlan's formu-
lation is used rather than the Restatement's. According to the Restatement formulation, the
"consensus" required to invoke the exception is that degree of international agreement which
would suffice to establish a customary rule of international law. The Restatement view is echoed
in Filartiga, where Judge Kaufman found an international rule condemning official state torture
grounded upon the "general assent of civilized nations." 630 F.2d at 880-81 (quoting The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)). By contrast, Judge Kaufman cited the compen-
sation norm at issue in Sabbatino as subject to "sharply conflicting views" in the international
community, a disagreement which precluded the establishment of a "settled rule of international
law." 630 F.2d at 881.
Yet the "consensus" which Justice Harlan would require to trigger the exception was more
than that sufficient to establish simple "illegality" of a given action under international law. In
a footnote he explained that in setting forth the division of opinion on expropriations "we do
not, of course, mean to say that there is no international standard in this area; we conclude only
that the matter is not meet for adjudication by domestic tribunals." 376 U.S. at 428 n.26.
Cases in which "consensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent a battleground
for conflicting ideologies" might be appropriate for domestic adjudication. Id. at 430 n.34. In
the absence of such a super-consensus, the act of state doctrine would apply "even if international
law ha[d] been violated." Id. at 431. Thus, even if it were "patently clear that this particular
expropriation was in violation of international law," Justice Harlan held, "it would still be
unwise for the Courts to so determine." Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
The danger of Justice Harlan's formulation is that it makes contrary state practice suddenly
relevant to the act of state question when it is almost entirely irrelevant to the jurisdictional
question of whether human rights norms exist. Violations of human rights are widespread and
critics contend that such counter-normative practice simply confirms the impossibility of regu-
lating domestic conduct within a Westphalian legal order. Mark Lane, Mass Killings by Govern-
meets: Lawful in World Legal Order, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 239 (1979); Mark Lane,
Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 269 (1978);
J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy, and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in
International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 609. Proponents of such norms, by far the majority, must
necessarily respond that widespread violations of human rights do not vitiate the status of human
rights norms as binding law. This is true, they argue, because the violating states virtually
never justify their acts as legally permissible. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
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2. The "Private Act" Exception
Under the private act exception, a court will not apply the act of
state doctrine if the plaintiff complains about conduct which the court
does not recognize as the official act of a sovereign government. In
Dunhill, a four justice plurality declined to invoke the act of state
doctrine because it found insufficient evidence of a 'public act of those
with authority to exercise sovereign powers." 67 In Sharon v. Time, Inc.68
the Court held that the Dunhill plurality opinion required "a fairly
stringent degree of formality" in proving that acts represented "official
attempts to implement public policy. '"69 The Sharon Court held that
when a state official steps outside the scope of his authority, his acts
are not "designed to give effect to a State's public interests" and thus
cannot serve as a basis for invoking the act of state doctrine.70
The Sharon court's description of the private act exception is akin
to the legal fiction developed by U.S. courts to circumvent the Elev-
enth Amendment to the United States Constitution. According to
this legal fiction, a court may deem state officials stripped of their
agency relationship to the state when they act contrary to its written
laws.7 1 Consequently, court judgments imposing liability do not of-
fend anyone. The plaintiff can proceed with a claim under international
law; the foreign state, now distanced from its renegade official, suffers
no affront to its sovereignty, and the Executive retains sole authority
supra note 56, § 702, reporters' note 1. This fragile argument is the linchpin of human rights
law's claim to legitimacy. Thus, the danger of Harlan's "consensus-plus" standard-which takes
widespread violations to indicate lack of consensus (as he understands it)-is that it would
permit a court predisposed to positivist criticisms of human rights law to seize on evidence of
violations to find the consensus exception inapplicable and dismiss a claim. Such a court could
accomplish at the act of state stage what it could not at the jurisdictional stage.
67. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694.
68. 599 F.Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
69. Id. at 544.
70. Id. Sharon was a libel action by a former Israeli Defense Minister against Time magazine
alleging that a story linking Sharon to a massacre in Lebanon during the 1982 Israeli invasion
was false. Id. at 542. The magazine raised an act of state defense, arguing that "trial of this
action will require the jury to render judgment as to numerous acts of the States of Israel and
Lebanon." Id. at 544. The district court disagreed:
Although actions by military officers are often considered acts of state, they are acts of state
only because they are officially authorized. The actions of an official acting outside the
scope of his authority as an agent of the state are simply not acts of state. In no sense are
such acts designed to give effect to a State's public interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
71. See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Such acts will still
be considered "state action," however, for purposes of sustaining jurisdiction under the Fourteenth
Amendment. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 290 (4th ed. 1983). To follow
through on the analogy, foreign officials would be deemed to have acted in their official capacities
for purposes of making their conduct susceptible to international law, but for act of state
purposes, the claim would be "one which does not effect the state in its sovereign or governmental
capacity." Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
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to conduct relations with the foreign state qua state. Only the defen-
dant suffers, and he has presumably violated both his own state's laws
and international law.
The Dunhill plurality opinion and Sharon embody differing varia-
tions on the private act theme. The justices in Dunhill determined
that commercial activities are by their nature private and that regard-
less of demonstrable connections between the commercial enterprise
and the sovereign, commercial acts are not those of a state official.7 2
Sharon, by contrast, describes acts which are generally viewed as
sovereign in nature but which in the particular instance do not rep-
resent the public policy of the state. For example, a policeman's
interrogation of a suspect is generally viewed as a sovereign act, but
the use of torture in the course of an interrogation may exceed the
limits imposed by a particular state's laws. This was essentially Judge
Kaufman's logic in Filartiga: an act of torture directly contrary to the
laws of Paraguay and subsequently unratified by the Paraguayan gov-
ernment, he argued, "could hardly be characterized as an act of state."7 3
3. The Bernstein Exception
Under the Bernstein exception, a court will decline to invoke the
act of state doctrine if it receives written assurances from the Executive
Branch that full adjudication of a claim will not interfere with exec-
utive foreign policy-making. 74 Although no Supreme Court majority
has adopted this exception, 7" its logic is compelling. The Bernstein
exception addresses the central presumption underlying the modern
doctrine-that judicial pronouncements on foreign policy may inter-
fere with the Executive's diplomatic efforts-and rebuts it with tan-
gible evidence. Indeed, compared to the other exceptions to the doc-
72. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 702-06.
73. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889.
74. The exception derives from Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). Although Bernstein predates Sabbatino, the relevance
of its holding was greatly magnified by Sabbatino's firm grounding of act of state in separation
of powers principles.
75. In Citibank, Justices Douglas and Brennan objected that the Bernstei exception represents
an abdication of the judicial function in favor of purely political decisions. Citibank, 406 U.S.
at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 790-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Yet a Bertstein letter
is simply the most efficient way for a court to gauge the Executive's position. A court is no less
beholden to the Executive when it performs the same function, only less efficiently, by ascer-
taining executive policy through its own independent investigation. The Douglas/Brennan
objection thus proves too much, since judicial opposition to following executive positions on
foreign policy is fundamentally incompatible with an act of state doctrine based in separation-
of-powers concerns. Taken seriously, the objection challenges the very existence of the doctrine
as described by Sabbatino and its progeny. Brennan himself avoids this difficulty by sidestepping
the entire act of state debate, contending instead that act of state is simply a specific application
of the political question doctrine. Id. at 787-88.
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trine discussed by courts and commentators, receipt of a Bernstein
letter is not really an "exception" at all. It is instead a prior deter-
mination that the doctrine should not be invoked because one of its
prima facie components is missing. 76
III. ACT OF STATE AS A CHOICE OF LAW RULE
A. The Kirkpatrick Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Kirkpatrick is primarily relevant to
the second of the three issues just reviewed-whether act of state
functions as an abstention or a choice of law rule. As we will see,
however, the Court's adoption of the choice of law approach requires
us to think quite differently about the act of state doctrine as a whole
and so implicates the doctrine's rationale and exceptions as well.
Kirkpatrick was an action by an unsuccessful U.S. bidder, W.S.
Kirkpatrick, on a construction contract with the Nigerian govern-
ment. The American company which was awarded the contract had
arranged for bribes to be paid to Nigerian officials, acts for which the
company was later prosecuted under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.7" The defendants-an officer of the successful bidder and a Ni-
gerian citizen who served as its middleman--argued that in order to
prevail Kirkpatrick had to prove that Nigerian officials received pay-
ments in violation of Nigerian law. Only after such proof was offered
could the court conclude that the contract was invalid. 78
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Scalia disagreed
with the defendant's argument and held act of state inapplicable
because none of the claims called into question the validity of an
official act of the Nigerian government. 79 The legality of the contract
was not at issue. In explaining this view Justice Scalia provided the
Supreme Court's clearest statement of how the act of state doctrine
functions as a choice of law rule:
76. This article will not consider the Bernstein exception further for the reason that its
application in any given case is largely out of the hands of courts. Because it depends on the
solicitude of the Executive, Bernstein provides no consistent theory of how act of state should
function in cases involving a breach of international law. Moreover, plaintiffs will likely be
frustrated in attempting to convince the State Department to issue a Bernstein letter, which it
has done with decreasing frequency in recent years. Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State
Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 369 (1986).
77. 493 U.S. at 402 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2).
78. Id. at 406.
79. "Nothing in the present suit requires the court to declare invalid, and thus ineffective
as 'a rule of decision for the court of this country' the official act of a foreign sovereign." Id. at
405 (quoting Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 310).
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[The act of state doctrine is not some vague doctrine of abstention
but a "principle of decision binding on federal and state courts alike"
[quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427]. As we said in Ricaud, "the
act within its own borders of one sovereign state becomes a rule
of decision for the courts of this country .... ." The short of the
matter is this: Courts in the United States have the power, and
ordinarily the obligation to decide cases and controversies properly
presented to them. The act of state doctrine does not establish an
exception for cases and controversies that may embarass foreign
governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding,
the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions
shall be deemed valid. That doctrine has no application to the
present case because the validity of no foreign sovereign is at
issue. 80
B. How Act of State Functions as a Choice of Law Rule
In an oft-cited 1967 article, Professor Louis Henkin described act
of state as a "special rule modifying the ordinary rules of conflict of
laws."81 Professor Henkin's view has become the standard account of
act of state so conceived82 and finds support, albeit in somewhat cryptic
passages, throughout the Supreme Court's pre-Kirkpatrick decisions.83
Henkin's view, therefore, probably best explains how Justice Scalia
intended the doctrine to function.
The Henkin approach is a methodological exposition of how act of
state interacts with the normal choice of law process. As an example,
take a case in which a defendant's acts are alleged to violate interna-
tional law. In such a case, the act of state doctrine will inevitably be
raised as a defense. The Henkin view begins with the assumption that
the court would, separate and apart from its act of state discussion,
engage in a conflicts analysis to choose the appropriate rule of decision.
It further assumes that in such an analysis the court would follow a
traditional, territorially-based choice of law theory such as appears in
the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws.84 The rules of decision ar-
guably applicable to the claim would be the law of the defendant's
home state, the law of the forum, or international law.
80. Id. at 406, 409-10.
81. Louis Henkin, Act ofState Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 175, 178 (1967).
82. See Dellapenna, supra note 47, at 41 n.221 (collecting citations to scholarly comments
adopting the Henkin perspective).
83. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 705 n. 18; Citibank, 406 U.S. at 763; Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
438; Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 309.
84. See Dellapenna, supra note 47, at 42; Monroe Leigh & Michael David Sandier, Dunbill:
Toward a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 685, 713-14 (1976).
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In tort cases85 the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws follows the
principle of lex loci delictus: the "law of the place of the wrong"
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury. 86 Accord-
ingly, the law of the foreign state would be chosen. That law could
take a number of approaches: it could deem the official's acts legal, it
could deem them illegal, or, as appears to have been the case in
Filartiga, it could find that the official received approval for acts from
his superiors despite their illegality under statute. In a normal conflicts
analysis, the court would first determine the substance of the foreign
law and then decide whether the defendant had violated its terms.
The Henkin view assumes that the court would not find a violation.
Traditional conflicts principles, however, provide courts with an
escape hatch" to avoid the enforcement of laws which violate a deep-
seated policy of the forum, characterized by Judge Cardozo as "some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the commonweal. '87 In place of
foreign law, therefore, courts could substitute the law of the forum.88
The "fundamental principle" relevant to this discussion is the condem-
nation of violations of international law. The court could not uphold
a foreign law which sanctioned the defendant's acts if those acts
85. In contracts cases the Restatement also takes a territorial approach, applying the law of the
place of contracting to issues related to creation of the contract and the law of the place of
performance to issues concerned with performance. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS ("REsTATEMiENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws") §§ 332, 358 (1934). Since I am
concerned here with acts alleged to be in violation of international law, and the international
law merchant has long faded into history, I restrict my analysis to tort claims.
86. Id. § 378.
87. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918). The New York Court of Appeals
later described the public policy exception as preventing "the approval of a transaction which is
inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense." Intercon-
tinental Hotels Corporation v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (N.Y. 1964). New Jersey courts
have followed the Loucks standard. See Carter v. Sandberg, 458 A.28 924, 926 (N.J. 1983).
Illinois courts describe the exception as concerned with policies "contrary to pure morals or
abstract justice, or .. . [where] the enforcement would be of evil example and harmful to its
own people." Champagnie v. Q.E. O'Neill Construction Co., 395 N.E.2d 990, 992 (Il1. 1979).
See generally Jeffrey Jackson, No Place Like Home: Public Policy and Prudent Practice in the Conflict
of Laws, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 1195 (1988); Holly Sprague, Note, Choice of Law: "A Fond Farewell"
to Comity and Public Policy, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1986); Gary J. Simson, The Public Policy
Doctrine in Choice of Law: A Reconsideration of Old Themes, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 391; Conrad G.
Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969
(1956).
88. See, e.g., Union Trust v. Grossman, 245 U.S. 412, 416 (1918) (Holmes, J.). Because a
forum's policy on a particular issue is derived primarily from its statutes and judicial decisions,
Champagnie, 395 N.E. 2d at 993; Intercontinental Hotels, 203 N.E. 2d at 212, the policy and
the rule of decision applicable to the case at hand will be one and the same. For example, a
state policy against gambling contracts is also a rule of decision making such contracts unen-
forceable. See Resorts International, Inc. v. Zonis, 577 F.Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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violated international law.89 On this basis it would reject foreign law
as the rule of decision and substitute international law (as incorporated
into U.S. law), or, pursuant to the Erie doctrine, the law of the state
in which the court sits.90 Either one of these rules would hold the
defendant liable.
The court's next step would be to consider the defendant's act of
state defense. Kirkpatrick held that "the acts of foreign sovereigns taken
within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." 9' The only rule
of decision that could validate the internationally illegal acts of a
foreign official would be the law of his own state, under the aegis of
which he was purporting to act. The act of state doctrine thus pre-
cludes courts from resorting to the escape hatch of public policy and
requires them to adhere to their initial choice of foreign domestic law.
Because the defendant's acts must be "deemed valid," moreover, the
doctrine further precludes actual adjudication under foreign domestic
law and instead presumes their legality thereunder.
Finally, a court must consider any exceptions to the doctrine. If an
exception proves relevant and, in a court's view, outweighs the reasons
for invoking act of state in the first place, then the court would retreat
from its selection of foreign domestic law. Presumably, it would return
to the rule of decision previously selected when forum policy trumped
the lex loci rule. 92
89. See Kirgis, Act of State Exceptions and Choice of Law, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 173, 180
(1967) ("the traditional public policy exception, with its inward focus on the prevailing values
of the forum, would provide a tempting path for a domestic court to take in avoidance of the
foreign law.").
90. State law is mentioned here merely because it is an available option for a federal court
seeking to apply "forum" law. In Sabbatino, however, the Court probably precluded this option
by holding that issues concerning American relations with other nations must be governed
exclusively by federal law:
[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding
the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our
relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclu-
sively as an aspect of federal law. It seems fair to assume that the court did not have rules
like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.
376 U.S. at 425.
91. 493 U.S. at 409.
92. Sabbatino contains no explicit discussion of the choice of law issue but does hint at this
multi-tiered approach. Banco National urged the court to apply forum law to the transaction.
Justice Harlan responded that this was precisely what act of state was designed to avoid, since
the doctrine concerns "the limits for determining the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law."
376 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added). The suggestion here is that an initial conflicts analysis would
have "otherwise" chosen Cuban law as the rule of decision but that its "validity" would be open
to question, a question to be foreclosed by the act of state doctrine. Working backwards, such
a question could only be raised by another rule of decision, namely the forum policy which the
respondents urged the Court to apply. But because act of state also "reflects the desirability of
presuming the relevant transaction valid," id., the Court could not apply the forum rule. Since
Justice Harlan spends much of the opinion discussing relevant principles of international law,
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IV. THE FAILINGS OF THE CHOICE OF LAW VIEW
Unfortunately the Henkin view simply does not stand up to scm-
tiny. At each turn, the step-by-step approach just outlined reveals
numerous inconsistencies. In light of these problems, a proponent of
Kirkpatrick might attempt to salvage act of state as a choice of law
rule by abandoning the traditional lex loci framework and setting the
doctrine against a backdrop of modern conflicts theories. Yet, these
theories have problems of their own. In this section I take a closer
look at act of state as it would function by reference to traditional and
modern conflicts theories.
A. The Traditional Approach
Initially, one might ask why federal courts would even resort to
outmoded territorialist conflicts principles. One answer would be that
they are compelled to do so by the Erie doctrine: if the state in which
they sit follows the lex loci approach then they must as well. 93 However,
not only have most states abandoned lex loci in favor of more flexible
modern theories, 94 but there is also a problem of federalism. Given
Sabbatino's holding that act of state is a question of federal law,
applying the Erie rule would require the federal courts to undertake
the anomalous task of shaping a doctrine of federal law to fit a pre-
existing framework established by state law. Maintaining only a resid-
uum of federal control over the choice of law process would hardly fit
with the Supreme Court's broad view that "[tlhe problems surrounding
the act of state doctrine are ... intrinsically federal." 95
Alternatively, one might take the view that even in diversity cases
the Erie rule is inapplicable because all issues related to act of state,
including those arising in the initial conflicts analysis, are reserved to
one may assume further that the forum policy arguably applicable would be the international
norms concerning expropriation.
Stated another way, Justice Harlan could only suggest a need for "limits" on a challenge to
Cuban law if some other substantive rule created such a challenge. Under the lex loci approach
that other rule would be forum policy. Further, if act of state presumes the transaction to be
"valid," and Cuban law is the only rule according to which it is necessarily valid, then act of
state must function to reject the challenge offered by forum policy and reinstate the validation
offered by Cuban law.
93. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manuf. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
94. See Herma Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV.
521, 582 (1983) (only 16 states and Washington, D.C. still follow lx lxi; of these, only nine
have explicitly rejected modem conflicts theories).
95. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427.
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the federal government. 96 In that case the federal courts would have
discretion to fashion a common law of conflicts in order to further the
federal interest at hand. 97 If this is the case, then the willingness of
federal courts to adopt lex loci as a rule of federal law would turn
entirely on whether it furthers the interests implicit in the various
stages of the analysis, i.e., the interests in the policy of the forum
used to trump the initial choice of foreign domestic law, in act of
state itself, and in the various exceptions to the doctrine. Given the
problems with lex loci we are about to consider,9" it seems unlikely
that courts would select this cumbersome mode of analysis to advance
the federal interest.
1. Initial Choice of Foreign Domestic Law
As the first step in its traditional conflicts analysis, a court in our
scenario chooses the law of the defendant's home state. Presumably
the court would then evaluate the legality of the defendant's acts under
that law. Yet, for reasons of international comity, federal courts have
long refused to hold foreign officials liable for violations of their own
law. 99 In Sabbatino, for example, the Supreme Court rejected an ar-
gument that U.S. courts should not enforce the Cuban confiscation
decree because it failed to comply with the requirements of Cuban
law. The Court held that, in order to avoid causing offense, "one
96. See generally Peter Wesren & Jeffrey Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of
Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311 (1980). The force of this argument is strengthened by the
fact that many of the concerns traditionally associated with act of state would also be considered
in the court's initial conflicts analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 132-140. A neat
separation of srate and federal law issues is difficult if not impossible. According to this analysis,
the entire process would implicate issues of exclusive federal interest (those concerning foreign
affairs) and therefore be considered a matter of federal law. See Yvonne Marcuse, International
Choice of Law: A Proposal for a New "Endave" of Federal Common Law, 5 FORDHAbI INT'L L.J.
319, 323 (1982).
97. See Paul Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice
of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.
99. West v. Multibanco Comermex. S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[t]he
evaluation by one sovereign of foreign officers' compliance with their own laws would, at least
in the absence of the foreign sovereign's consent, intrude upon that state's coequal status"), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Bernstein v. van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 114 F.2d 438, 444 (2nd Cir. 1940) ("[ijt should make no difference whether the foreign
act is, under local law, partially or wholly, technically or fundamentally illegal . . . .So long
as the act is the act of the foreign sovereign, it matters not how grossly the sovereign has
transgressed its own laws"); Bandes v. Harlow & Jones Inc., 570 F.Supp. 955, 961 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), revd on other grounds, 852 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1988). See also RESTATBENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, § 443 cmt. d ("(t]hus, courts in the United States will
not entertain challenges to the validity or lawfulness of a taking by a foreign state on the ground
that it was contrary to the state's own constitution or laws, or that a law on a decree had not
been properly enacted.").
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nation must recognize the act of the sovereign power of another, so
long as it has jurisdiction under international law, even if it is improper
according to the internal law of the latter state." 100
The Court will therefore ignore the substance of foreign law and
avoid such questions as whether the defendant exceeded his legal
authority to act; whether the foreign state would accord him immunity
for his conduct; and whether the law provides a civil remedy for the
type of conduct at issue. As explained more fully below, the defendant
cannot be held liable if his state's law serves as the rule of decision. l0
Nevertheless, an alternative analysis exists for a U.S. court pur-
porting to apply the law of a foreign state. While the applicable "law"
could consist of the state's own rules it could also be a relevant
principle of international law. 102 As in the United States, the foreign
state's law could be deemed to incorporate international norms, 10 3 or
those norms could apply of their own force as superior to any contrary
domestic principle.1 04 Alternatively, courts of the foreign state might
adhere to a rule of construction "which obliges them to interpret laws
whenever possible so as not to conflict with international law."'' 5
The precise approach will vary from state to state, and some may
grant no weight at all to international law. For states in which
international law would be applied as a rule of decision, however, the
U.S. court would no longer be acting so presumptuously as to enforce
another state's internal laws against its own officials. The rule applied
would be a universal one, binding on all states equally. The categorical
prohibition on liability outlined above would therefore not apply.
2. The Public Policy Escape Hatch
In order to reach the next step of our analysis, we must assume that
the court has applied foreign domestic law without reference to inter-
national principles. As discussed, the court could not hold the defen-
100. 376 U.S. at 415 n.17.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 118-121.
102. Courts frequently obscure this reasoning by obsessively quoting Underhill. In dicta, the
Underhill court indirectly addressed how international law should affect the applicability of the
act of state doctrine. Yet, the claims at issue in Underhill did not involve actual violations of
international law. See infra note 225. In fact, American courts throughout the nineteenth century
frequently inquired into the consistency of sovereign acts with the law of nations. See, e.g., Rose
v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 240, 276-77 (1808); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,
422-23 (1815); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
103. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
104. See Dale S. Collinson, Sabbatino: The Treatment of International Law in American Courts,
3 COLUas. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 27, 38-39 (1964) ("that international law can be applied as a part
of-or, alternatively, as a law superior to-the internal law of the acting state, is a sound
possibility as a matter of conflict of laws theory.").
105. Michael Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am J. INT'L L. 826, 841 (1959).
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dant liable under that law.' 0 6 Faced with the prospect of sanctioning
a violation of international law, the court will then invoke the public
policy of the forum, which we must presume finds such violations
offensive.
In light of the other policies which will come into play later in our
analysis,107 it is important to emphasize that the threshold for "offen-
siveness" here is quite high. 08 Both the federal courts, which discuss
public policy as an exception to the full faith and credit requirement,
and state courts, which do so as part of their traditional conflicts rules,
repeatedly have held that mere disagreement with foreign law is
insufficient. The law in question must be "obnoxious" to the interests
of the forum.'°9 In the international community, where diversity of
national cultures is vigorously protected, 110 a finding of illegitimate
diversity will be rare. 11' Given that resort to public policy is such an
unusual step, one might assume that the court's conflicts analysis
would end upon a finding that such policy has been offended.
In the next section, however, we will see that contrary to this
assumption, the Kirkpatrick view assumes the existence of policies
which trump those invoked by the escape hatch.112 At this juncture
two additional problems are evident. First, in traditional conflicts law
the public policy exception arguably functioned only to decline en-
forcement of foreign causes of action, not to strike defenses grounded
106. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 122-125.
108. The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws noted that the application of its provision for
a public policy escape hatch is "extremely limited." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws, supra note 85, § 612 cmt. c. "A mere difference between the laws of the two states will
not render the enforcement of a cause of action created in one state contrary to the public policy
of the other." Id.
109. Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 162 (1932) (Brandeis, J.).
110. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) ("[elvery
state has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems,
without interference in any form by another State"); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc.
6014 (1966) ("in fulfillment of the principle of self-determination Estates may] .. . freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment"); Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945, art. 8, 70 U.N.T.S. 237 ("Every
member State of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the States of the
League and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as one of the rights of those states,
and shall pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form."); Charter of the
Organization of American States, April 19, 1948, art. 16, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 12 ("No State may
use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to
force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantage of any kind.").
111. Simson, supra note 87, at 408-12.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 117-121.
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in foreign law. The best known articulation of this distinction is
Justice Brandeis' opinion in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper:
A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of
action. In doing so, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired
the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it
elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a substantive defense
under the applicable law of another state, as under the circum-
stances here presented, subjects the defendant to irremediable
liability. This may not be done. 113
Justice Brandeis' argument becomes even stronger if our case were to
involve two aliens, as in Filartiga-type claims. In such cases the forum
(the United States) is neutral as between the two parties. Its only
interest is in avoiding the use of its courts to serve as vehicles to
enforce policies it finds distasteful. It has no interest in preventing
the defendant from successfully asserting his defense elsewhere-the
practical result of striking that defense on public policy grounds and
issuing a judgment on the merits of the plaintiff's claims. 114
The Brandeis distinction follows the logic of territorial conflicts
theory, which gave rise to the public policy escape hatch in the first
place. When a plaintiff's claim is rejected on public policy grounds,
the court is not affecting his ability to enforce rights which vested
where the acts occurred; the plaintiff is simply being told to exercise
those rights in another forum. When the court strikes a defense,
however, it strips the defendant of the ability to claim rights which
presumably vested in the same manner as the plaintiff's. A territorial
conflicts theory cannot sanction this uneven result.
The second problem with invoking public policy in this case is that
contacts with the forum may be lacking. Paulsen and Sovern have
observed that "[tlhe overwhelming number of cases which have re-
jected foreign law on public policy grounds are cases with which the
forum had some important connection."1 15 If the plaintiff in our case
is a U.S. citizen claiming injury by a foreign official or entity this
113. 286 U.S. at 160. Brandeis' distinction is also implicit in the Restatement (First) of Conflict
of Laws, published two years after Clapper, which speaks only of a public-policy bar against
"actions." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFL.CT OF LAWS, supra note 85, § 612. But see Arthur
Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1033-
34 (1940) (arguing that Clapper awards defendants "a more favorable position in matters of
public policy").
114. RussuLL WEimrRAuB, CoMMEArrYtv ON THE CONFLCT OF LAWS 85 (3d ed. 1986)
("[i]n no event should a neutral forum invoke its own public policy to affect the result on the
merits as it would, for example if it denied effect to a defense based on obnoxious foreign law");
Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 87, at 1012.
115. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 87, at 981; see also Nussbaum, supra note 113, at 1031-
32.
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problem is mitigated. In Filartiga-type actions, however, none of the
relevant acts will have occurred in the forum. The force of this
argument will vary depending upon which contacts the court finds
significant; the court, for example, may find significance in the plain-
tiff's after-acquired domicile in the forum. 116 In that case the court
may be less reluctant to invoke forum policy. The general point is
that one may not assume, without close examination of the relevant
contacts in each case, that a court would in fact find its public policy
offended. If the case law of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws
era is to be the guide, a claim involving no significant contacts with
the forum would be unlikely to merit application of the public policy
escape hatch. For some courts, this may describe Filartiga-type alien
tort claims.
3. The Act of State Doctrine
Under the Henkin view, the act of state doctrine functions to
preclude use of the public policy escape hatch. At first glance the
plaintiff in our case appears to fare quite well. Sabbatino and Kirkpatrick
invoked act of state to avoid interference with executive foreign policy-
making, but even before reaching that point the court already would
have exited via the public policy escape hatch, a step not possible
without executive approval of both the substance of that policy and
its enforcement against the particular defendant. '1 7 Executive oppo-
116. Id. (discussing domicile as contact leading forum to apply the public policy escape
hatch).
117. Executive agreement on the substance of the policy would follow from the doctrine's
limited applicability to rules of decision that are profoundly repugnant to the forum's sensibil-
ities. See e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 277 (1881) ("A contract to bribe or
corruptly influence officers of a foreign government will not be enforced in the courts of this
country . . . [because of) the inherent viciousness of the transaction, its repugnance to our
morality, and the pernicious effect which its enforcement by our courts would have upon our
people"); Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 87, at 980 ([ojur courts properly should deny effect to
a foreign contract of slavery or an agreement to subvert the integrity of the governmental
processes of a friendly foreign government. In a world in which despotic governments exist, our
courts should not become the handmaidens of tyrants.") A policy in which only one (or perhaps
two) branches of the federal government concurred would hardly fit within these unequivocal
formulations.
The same requirement of unanimity explains why executive opposition to invoking forum
policy in a particular case would preclude resort to the escape hatch. If the Executive stated that
a certain claim would better be resolved diplomatically than through litigation, it would be
stating its opposition to the use of forum policy in that case. A court that nevertheless invoked
the escape hatch would, for that specific case, be defying the Executive's wishes in precisely the
same degree as if the Executive had declared its general opposition to the substance of the policy,
Thus, for litigants in any given case who claim violation of international norms, an executive
declaration that their claims would embarrass its relations with the defendant's government is
functionally indistinguishable from a declaration that the United States did not support the
enforcement of those norms generally. In both instances a court could not apply an established
forum policy to the facts before it.
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sition to either aspect of the policy would mean that the policy was
not important enough to override the court's initial choice of foreign
domestic law. Accordingly, if the Executive approves both the policy
and its use in particular litigation, a court could not invoke act of
state based on interference with executive prerogatives. Therefore, no
separation of powers issues would be implicated by permitting the
claim to proceed.
Perhaps after Kirkpatrick's explicit designation of act of state as a
choice of law rule this analysis will carry the day with courts which
follow a traditional conflicts analysis. If pre-Kirkpatrick decisions are
any guide, however, courts which view act of state as a conflicts rule
do not consider forum policy at all. From an implicit determination
that the lex loci principle governs, they proceed directly to conclude
that acts committed by foreign officials on their own soil are valid per
se." 8 These courts fail to understand that without a consideration of
forum policy, lex loci and act of state reach identical results: the
application of foreign domestic law. Act of state analysis thus becomes
superfluous. 119 Remarkable as it may seem for courts to gloss over this
problem, the lack of scrutiny is an inevitable result of the Supreme
Court's failure to prescribe how executive policy is to be ascertained
and what level of interference is necessary to trigger act of state. 120
Once act of state is invoked, Kirkpatrick mandates that the defen-
dants' acts be "deemed valid."' 121 Courts are thus precluded from
inquiring whether courts of the defendant's state would apply norms
of international law as the rule of decision. Thus, even if the foreign
state's law and the forum's law both dictate that international norms
should serve as the rule of decision, Kirkpatrick still mandates dismissal
on act of state grounds.
4. The Consensus and Private Act Exceptions Reexamined
a. The Consensus Exception
The consensus exception provides that act of state is inapplicable if
a rule of law has widespread support in the international community. 22
118. E.g., Citibank, 406 U.S. at 763; Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 418; Randall v. Aramco, 778
F.2d at 1146, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985); Sharon v. Time, 599 F.Supp. at 546; Nat'l Am. Corp., 448
F.Supp. at 640 n.30. Kirkpatrick itself makes no mention of forum policy.
119. One might object that act of state takes the additional step of presuming the defendant's
acts valid, regardless of the substance of the foreign state's law. However, in the scheme of lex
loci, an initial finding that a defendant's acts are legal under his nation's law is essential. If the
acts were held illegal, there would be nfo "repugnant" result necessitating reversal as against
public policy. In turn, there would be no need to invoke act of state to override public policy.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
121. 493 U.S. at 409.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66.
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The exception reassures the court that in following a particular inter-
national norm, it will not (or -should not) offend the defendant's
government or the international community at large; the court will
not be enforcing a parochial U.S. conception of what international law
should be, but an established standard by which the defendant's gov-
ernment is itself bound.
The consensus exception, however, is a far weaker justification for
applying international law than the public policy escape hatch. The
exception holds that no relevant actor will be offended if the defendant
is held liable. By contrast, under a forum-policy analysis, the failure
to enforce international norms is profoundly repugnant to the national
conscience. Yet in the lex loci scheme, this vastly stronger argument
for applying forum policy is overridden by the act of state doctrine.
The lex loci analysis thus becomes illogical: it makes little sense that
international law should prevail under the consensus exception but
not when there are even stronger reasons, embodied in the forum
policy, for applying the same law. If respect for international norms
justifies the consensus exception, then a court's analysis should end
once forum policy displaces lex loci. 123
Both Sabbatino and Kirkpatrick make clear that the concern under-
lying act of state is not that foreign governments might take offense
at a claim going forward. Rather, act of state is designed to prevent
judicial interference with executive prerogatives in foreign policy. If
such separation of power concerns are sufficient to defeat a strong
forum policy on international law, they should not give way to the
weak policy on international law embodied in the consensus exception.
Indeed, the term "exception" seems almost inappropriate here. The
consensus approach, by tying act of state to international law, ignores
such issues as the delicacy of relations between the United States and
the defendant's government, executive attempts to resolve the issue
diplomatically, and executive approval or disapproval of the litiga-
tion. 124 These purely domestic issues simply cannot be resolved by
ascertaining the views of the international community on a particular
point.
Courts might conceivably harmonize international consensus and
separation of powers concerns by presuming that the executive always
123. We noted above that one option for a court following the lex loci rule would be to view
the "law" of the foreign state as reflecting, incorporating or conforming to international norms.
See supra text accompanying notes 102-105. The internal logic of the Henkin view does not
permit such an option. Yet ifa court were to follow the consensus exception, it would duplicate
the results obtained by a foreign court which looks to international law. The reasons for not
following this route in the first instance are thus highly suspect.
124. See Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction (The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States), 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 468, 482 (1989).
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approves of litigation which seeks to enforce widely accepted inter-
national rules. A majority on the Supreme Court, however, was un-
willing to accept explicit executive statements on individual cases. 125 It
is therefore unlikely that the Court would accept speculative pre-
sumptions concerning executive policy for an entire class of cases.
b. The Private Act Exception
The private act exception has been formulated in two different ways.
The first, exemplified by the Dunhill plurality opinion, deems certain
acts (such as commercial transactions) private by their very nature.
The second, represented by Sharon and the Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution, involves acts which are generally
viewed as sovereign but which, in particular instances, transgress
national policies or written laws. 126 Judge Kaufman used this second
approach Filartiga, stating that acts "unratified" by a foreign govern-
ment are not "official" for act of state purposes.
The problem with the Dunhill approach in our case is that the acts
of private persons 127 are not subject to international law. 128 In the
Henkin approach, applying the private act exception returns the court
to application of the law embodied in the public policy of the forum,
which in our case is international law. Yet the court cannot simulta-
neously consider our defendant a private actor and subject him to
liability under international law.
In Filartiga-type human rights cases, the Sharon/Eleventh Amend-
ment model of temporary private status seems more promising. Ac-
cording to this view, a state official who engages in unauthorized or
illegal conduct would be subject to the court's jurisdiction because he
could not have engaged in the forbidden conduct but for the power
conferred on him by state authority. 129 For jurisdictional purposes,
125. In Citibank, only Justices Rehnquist, Burger, and White voted to adopt the Bernstein
exception. 406 U.S. at 765.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
127. Private persons are those that do not act on behalf of an entity with international legal
personality.
128. I. BROWN IE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAw 60-69 (4th ed. 1990)
(listing entities with international personality); see also, R.ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 702, reporter's note 1 ("customary international law prohibits the particular human
rights violations indicated [in the main text] if the violations are state policy" [emphasis added]).
129. In Home Tel. & Tel., the Supreme Court made the same point in discussing liability of
a state official under the Fourteenth Amendment:
Under these circumstances it may not be doubted that where a state officer under an
assertion of power from the State is doing an act which could only be done upon the
predicate that there was such power, the inquiry as to the repugnancy of the act to the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be avoided by insisting that there is a want of power. That
is to say, a state officer cannot on the one hand as a means of doing a wrong forbidden by
the Amendment proceed upon the assumption of the possession of state power and at the
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therefore, he would retain his official status. For purposes of deter-
mining liability he would be stripped of his official mantle and de-
prived of resort to an act of state defense. 130
Unfortunately, even this refined view proves incompatible with the
lex loci approach. The court has already been precluded at the outset
of its analysis from inquiring into the legality of the defendant's
conduct under his state's domestic law. If this were not the case and
courts were permitted to apply foreign domestic law as a true rule of
decision, (i.e., with the outcome not predetermined), then they would
do so when that law was first chosen by the lex loci rule. There would
simply be no need to resort to an exception to the act of state doctrine
to achieve the same result.
Accordingly, if the act of state doctrine is even to be reached in the
Henkin analysis, the court must accept the validity of the defendant's
acts under foreign law regardless of the law's actual content. This
being the case, a court cannot proceed to declare an official's actions
illegal under foreign law and thus "private" for purposes of creating
an exception to the act of state doctrine. The essence of the private
act exception is that domestic illegality equals liability. A perceptive
court will conclude that if this is indeed the operative principle
underlying the private act exception, then the exception simply du-
plicates lex loci. 131 If it does not, then the private act exception must
fail.
same time for the purpose of avoiding the application of the Amendment, deny the power
and thus accomplish the wrong.
Home Tel. & Tel., 227 U.S. at 288.
130. Of course, this is still fiction, but if the Supreme Court's construction of the Eleventh
Amendment is to be the model, then it must simply be accepted that the Court "has often
closed its eyes, quite deliberately, to the reality of whether a decree against an officer would
operate against the government. ... CLYDE E. JACOBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 157 (1972).
131. There is also the practical problem of determining whether the conduct is in fact illegal.
In essence, courts would be in the position of conducting a mini-trial of the foreign official
under his nation's penal statutes. See Filartiga, 577 F.Supp. at 864 (remand opinion) (discussing
illegality of torture under Paraguayan law). The defendant's claims in Forti v. Suarez-Maxon, 672
F.Supp. 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987) ("Forti I"), are illustrative. Forti was an alien tort action against
a former Argentine general who allegedly oversaw and approved acts of torture against political
dissidents. Id. at 1535-38. In support of an act of state defense, defendant Suarez-Mason asserted
that the ruling military junta in Argentina had enacted a state of siege law at the time the acts
took place which suspended all constitutional guarantees and directed the armed forces to "assume
responsibility for preventing terrorist acts and suppressing terrorist groups." Defendant's Mem-
orandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3-4, Forti I, 672 F.Supp.
1531. The plaintiffs countered that Suarez-Mason's acts remained illegal even under the state of
siege. Declaration of Alejandro M. Garro in Support of Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Forti
1, 672 F.Supp. 1531. The District Court ultimately sidestepped a choice between these com-
peting views of Argentine law, 672 F.Supp. at 1546, but the difficulty inherent in the process
is clear: in order to reject the act of state defense, how could the court avoid stepping into the
shoes of an Argentine court interpreting its own laws and defining the limits of the Junta's
authority?
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B. Modern Conflicts Rules
Given the problems of reconciling act of state with a traditional
conflicts analysis, it is possible that the Kirkpatrick court understood
the doctrine as consistent with modern conflict theories. Act of state,
however, seems incompatible with these theories as well. The confu-
sion which results from attempting to fit act of state within modern
conflicts theories stems from the theories' virtual elimination of the
public policy escape hatch. 132 Two related trends are responsible for
the demise of this intermediate step. First, modern conflicts rules no
longer apply mechanistic tests such as the place of the wrong or the
place of the contract to select a rule of decision. 133 As a result, forum
courts never find themselves bound by foreign laws from which they
need "escape." Second, contemporary theories incorporate the interests
and policies of the forum into their initial conflicts analyses.1 34 There
is no need to add a second tier of analysis in which the court considers
whether the law chosen by these factors would violate forum policy. 135
Without the public policy escape hatch, modern theories cannot
accommodate the act of state doctrine. Because the Restatement view
has proven to be the most popular of the modern approaches, 136 1 will
use it as the model of modern conflicts theory. In tort actions, the
Restatement provides that the local law of the state in which the injury
occurred will govern, "unless, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship" to the incident,
as determined by a list of contacts and interests. 137 Included on that
132. Under the traditional approach, the public policy escape hatch necessitates resort to act
of state. Henkin, supra note 81, at 181 ("[ilnternational law could become relevant ... in the
courts of the United States... only if governing law made it relevant. For example, international
law could come in through the 'side door' of public policy" [emphasis added]); Dellapenna,
supra note 47, at 42 ("the doctrine simply precludes a court from applying certain ordinary
escape devices like references to the forum's public policy"); see also Kirgis, supra note 89, at
173. Without it, under lex loci, the court would have chosen the law of the defendant's home
state and rendered the doctrine superfluous.
133. Scoles & Hay, supra note 22, at 42 (discussing dissatisfaction with and abandonment of
the fixed and thus mechanical rules of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws). In addition to
the "most significant relationship" analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1)
(1969), other prevalent theories are also marked by a departure from rules based on categories
of cases. Chief among these are Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations and Professor
Currie's government interest analysis. Robert Leflar, Cboice-Influvencing Considerations in Conflicts
Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LIAws (1963).
134. E.g. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6(2)(b) (1969); Leflar, supra
note 133, at 282; Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson-A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1237-38 (1963).
135. Sprague, supra note 87, at 1460 ("[t]he public policy exception is purely duplicative
and therefore obsolete, because the 'public policies' employed defensively in earlier times are
already an integral part of modern analysis .....
136. See Kay, supra note 94, at 556-57.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 146 (1969).
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list are "the relevant policies of the forum." 138 If the court were to
find United States policy insufficient to justify displacement of the
law of the foreign state, an act of state question would never arise
since its goal, application of foreign law, would have been accom-
plished by the initial conflicts analysis.
If, on the other hand, the court concluded that United States policy
on an issue of international law was sufficiently strong to displace local
law, the issue then becomes how act of state contributes or adds to
that result. The court could not compel dismissal for fear of embar-
rassing the Executive, since in the initial conflicts analysis, the court
would have already concluded that the forum policy was less important
than the need to enforce international norms. For the same reason, act
of state could not compel dismissal for fear of embarrassing the defen-
dant's government. Therefore, act of state, as a "super" forum policy
which supersedes all other competing policies, becomes unnecessary
since each of those policies are considered by the initial conflicts
principles. Act of state as a separate doctrinal entity becomes necessary
only if the conflicts analysis that precedes it inadequately assess the
concerns of the forum. 139 The comprehensive Restatement test is wholly
adequate in this regard.
In sum, under the Restatement approach, act of state must either
remain an entity distinct from the normal conflicts process or the
forum policy it represents must be folded into the normal conflicts
analysis. In the first case, act of state wholly duplicates the consider-
ation of forum policy in the initial conflicts analysis; in the second
case, it retains no independent function. In both instances, act of state
adds nothing of substance to a Restatement analysis. 140
V. ACT OF STATE RECAST: THE INTEGRATED CHOICE OF
LAW APPROACH
If the above analysis is correct, the two most promising aspects of
the act of state doctrine, the consensus and private act exceptions, are
138. Id. § 6(2Xb).
139. Stated another way, there is no reason to view act of state as a reaction to forum policy
rather than as an important expression of that policy.
140. Alternatively, one might argue that act of state functions as a "thumb on the scales"
for the Restatement test and dictates the weight it should accord the interests of foreign
governments and of the U.S. Executive in the course of interest balancing. According to this
view, when a court "invokes" act of state, it performs a conflicts analysis which gives special
weight to the factors embodied in the doctrine. Yet, it is unclear why courts should artificially
emphasize or deemphasize certain policies of the Executive and Legislative Branches. Courts are
well-equipped to discover the weight accorded these interests in the real world. For example,
the United States submitted an amicus brief in Filartiga supporting jurisdiction under the alien
tort statute. Such a statement of executive policy, or other evidence uncovered by a court in an
independent investigation, should be preferred in a conflicts analysis over preconceived notions
of interference with foreign policy-making.
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incompatible with a traditional choice of law framework. The doctrine
as a whole is incompatible with modern choice of law theories. In this
section, I offer a proposal for saving the act of state doctrine by
integrating the policies it embodies into a modern choice of law
analysis.
I begin with the premise that the initial conflicts analysis in an act
of state case would be a question of federal common law. As already
discussed, the complex interplay between the initial analysis and act
of state belies any attempt to designate the former as exclusively a
matter of state law and the latter exclusively federal. More fundamen-
tally, a federal court is probably not compelled by the Erie doctrine
to follow state choice of law rules. Absent legislative intent to the
contrary, the governing law in federal court is determined by the
source of the right sued upon. 141 The plaintiff in our case claims a
violation of rights under international rather than state law. The court's
conflicts analysis, therefore, will involve an inquiry into international
norms, which is a task for federal law, even in diversity cases. 142
If the federal court in our case will perform a common law choice
of law analysis as a matter of course, and if the act of state doctrine
is also a product of federal common law, the court could vastly improve
on the Kirkpatrick approach if it combined choice of law analysis and
act of state into a single integrated conflicts test. Act of state would
then cease to function as a separate doctrine. Its policies, along with
those represented by the public policy escape hatch, the consensus
exception, and the private act exception, would be incorporated into
a modern conflicts analysis.
Lawmaking by federal courts is primarily an attempt to further
federal government interests in areas where Congress has legislated to
displace state law but has failed to provide explicit rules. 143 The first
step in an integrated choice of law analysis, therefore, should deter-
mine whether Congress intended any particular rule of decision to
apply. 14 4 Absent such intent, a federal court has substantial discretion
to formulate "the best rule, based upon its own notions of policy and
141. Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956); PAUL
BATOR, DAVID J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 858 n.2 (3d ed. 1988).
142. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 29 (1976) ("federal common law may govern
even in diversity cases where a uniform national rule in necessary to further the interests of the
Federal Government"); James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL
L. REV. 185, 199 (1976) (logical extension of Sabbatino "brings conflicts questions involving
other countries under the umbrella of 'relations' and thus makes them a matter of federal law").
143. Mishkin, supra note 141, at 800.
144. Barkanic v. General Admin. of CAAC, 923 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1991) (court's task
in case under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is to "infer from the statutory language a choice
of law analysis that best effectuates Congress' overall intent"); Liu, 892 F.2d at 1426 (choice of
law under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act matter of Congressional intent).
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upon whatever policies it finds implicit in the constitutional and
statutory provisions it does have an obligation to follow."' 145 Having
once identified a federal interest, courts have freely applied a variety
of substantive standards, including international law, 146 state law 147
and amalgams of various rules which collectively further the federal
interest at hand. 148 The act of state doctrine is itself a product of the
courts' search for a rule of decision that best reflects federal policies
on international law and the internal distribution of power between
the Judicial and the Executive Branches. 149
The Supreme Court faces no barriers to recasting the act of state
doctrine as a component of a modern conflicts theory if such recasting
would do greater justice to federal policies than the lex loci approach.
Admittedly, integration of the various federal policies would require
a sharp departure from the doctrine as described in Sabbatino, Kirk-
patrick, and other cases of the modern era. At the same time, the
145. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. Rav.
881, 893 (1986) [citations omitted].
146. E.g., NewJersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 378-85 (1933) (division of river bound-
aries between states).
147. F.D.I.C. v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1989); Great Southwest Life
Ins. Co. v. Frazier, 860 F.2d 896, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1988); Orloffv. Allman, 819 F.2d 904,
909 (9th Cir. 1987).
148. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. at 860, 863-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (remand
opinion).
The articulation of a wholly new substantive rule involves a more complex process than simply
devising rules to choose between existing bodies of law. As set forth in Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Afills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), creating new substantive rules requires a finding that the grant of
federal jurisdiction also contains a "mandate to fashion a federal common law consistent with"
legislation in that area. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 413 (1964). In the alien tort context, a new rule would be
required at the remedial stage of the litigation, if at all. At the liability stage, international law
provides clear standards of conduct which bind states and, by necessary extension, their agents.
Whether and how individual victims should be compensated for such violations are issues not
contemplated by international law, which generally leaves issues of enforcement to individual
states. William R. Casco, The Federal Courts, ProtectiveJurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation
of the Law ofNations, 18 CONN. L. REv. 467, 475-76 (1986) ("[i]n Filartiga the United States
Departments of State and Justice pooled their resources and apparently were unable to find a
single instance in the entire world in which a court had recognized the existence of a private
tort remedy for torture based solely upon international law"); Sohn, Human Rights: Their
Implementation and Supervision by the United Nations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
369, 369-72 (Theodore Meron ed. 1984); see e.g. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N.
Doc. A/1034 (1975), Art. 11 (where act of torture has been committed by or at instigation of
public official, victim shall be afforded redress and compensation "in accordance with national
law").
These are issues, however, beyond the scope of this article. The act of state doctrine intervenes
at the liability stage and functions to end the litigation by choosing a rule of decision which
deems the defendant not liable. If this result is avoided by use of an integrated modern conflicts
analysis which chooses the international law of human rights, a court will still not have advanced
beyond the liability stage. While courts clearly have the authority to create a substantive law
of remedies as a matter of federal common law, this issue is not analyzed here.
149. Sabbatino, 376 f.S. at 421-27.
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Court would be giving substantially greater weight to the policies
underlying the act of state doctrine, thus lending needed legitimacy
to the process of explicating federal common law. Given that the
consensus and private act exceptions carry the potential of offending
both the government of another nation and the U.S. Executive, clarity
of reasoning in this area is no small asset.
The method of integrating an act of state and an initial conflicts
analysis would not necessarily follow the Second Restatement's "most
significant relationship" test, which has been adopted by a number of
federal courts.' 5 0 The integrated approach requires only that courts
free their analysis from the First Restatement's rigid territorigism and
consider on their own merits the various policies and interests which
appear throughout the Henkin approach. These policies and interests
would include non-interference with the Executive, avoiding offense
to the defendant's home state, fidelity to rules of international law,
and justice to the parties involved. Having chosen the rule of decision,
the court would then proceed to an adjudication on the merits under
that law. 151
VI. USE OF THE INTEGRATED CONFLICTS APPROACH IN
CASES UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
In recent years, the most dramatic clashes between principles of
international law and the act of state doctrine have occurred in human
rights claims brought under the alien tort statute. Superficially, the
conflict seems intractable:
150. See Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal., S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir.
1991), which states categorically that "[flederal common law follows the approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws." For more hesitant analyses, see Harris v. Polskie Linie
Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1987); Commercial Ins. Co. v. Pacific-Peru Constr.
Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1977).
151. One possible objection to the integrated approach is that by eliminating the act of state
doctrine, the approach makes it possible for courts to hold foreign officials liable under the own
laws. While this objection is well-taken, it applies only where an U.S. citizen sues a foreign
official for acts not subject to international law. The objection does not apply to suits between
two aliens for violations of foreign domestic law since the federal courts would lack subject-
matter jurisdiction under the alien tort statute (no international law issue), the diversity statute
(inapplicable to claims between two aliens) and the federal question provision (no international
law creating a federal common law issue). Nor would the objection apply to Filartiga-type alien
tort claims. As the next section will demonstrate, the statute's drafters intended international
law to apply in such cases. See infra text accompanying notes 173-222. As for the one case in
which liability under foreign domestic law is possible, one can only respond that a court in such
a case is unlikely to find the balance of policies weighing in favor of holding a foreign official
liable under his own law. The integrated approach does not alter the substance of policies now
given effect by the Henkin view. It merely frees those policies from their territorialist straight
jacket. If the dominant policy of the forum now forbids holding foreign officials in violation of
their own laws, therefore, that policy would dominate analysis under the integrated approach
as well.
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[I1n order for plaintiffs to assert jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, they must allege that the tortious acts were official
acts committed under color of law . . . This theory of recovery
requires precisely the type of inquiry in which the federal courts
have refused to engage under the Act of State doctrine.15 2
Courts and commentators have attempted to resolve this clash pri-
marily through use of the consensus and private act exceptions. In
this section, I examine how an integrated conflicts analysis functions
in alien tort cases. The integrated approach suggests a relatively
straightforward solution to this dilemma which the intricacies of act
of state jurisprudence have obscured.
A. Recent Decisions Under the Alien Tort Statute
The alien tort statute has become a new and exciting vehicle for
enforcing international norms in United States courts. Although en-
acted in 1789 as part of the First Judiciary Act, the statute attracted
few litigants prior to 1980.153 In that year, the Second Circuit handed
down Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and breathed new life into the statute. 154
Filartiga arose out of the political activities of Dr. Joel Filartiga, a
Paraguayan national and a long-time opponent of President Alfredo
Stroessner. In 1976, apparently in retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's op-
position activities, his son was kidnapped and tortured to death by
defendant Pena-Irala, then Chief of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. In
1978 Dr. Filartiga's daughter emigrated to the United States and
learned that Pena-Irala was in New York. Given this opportunity to
obtain personal jurisdiction over Pena-Irala, the daughter filed suit in
152. Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F.Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
153. Prior to 1980, plaintiffs invoked the alien tort statute in only twenty-one reported
decisions. These cases are compiled in Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International
Law Claimr: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (Part 1), 473
(Part II), 4 n. 15. Of these, jurisdiction under the statute was sustained in only two cases. Id.
at 5. Those cases were Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), involving a child custody
dispute between two Lebanese nationals, and Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795),
an action for restitution of property aboard a Spanish vessel seized as a prize of war. In addition,
in a 1907 advisory opinion, the Attorney General of the United States suggested that the statute
could serve as remedy for Mexican nationals aggrieved by the diversion of a river within the
United States. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907).
In the mid-1970s, panels of the Second Circuit twice held that the statute did not provide
jurisdiction over claims between an alien and an official of his own government. ITT v. Vencap,
519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,
429 U.S. 835 (1976).
154. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Comprehensive discussions of Filartiga may be found in
Burley, supra note 65, Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, Randall, supra note 153; Steven M.
Schneebaum, The Enforceability of Customary Norms of International Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
289 (1982); Andrew M. Soble, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in
Federal Court, 74 CAL. L. REv. 127 (1986).
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the United States District Court on behalf of herself and her father,
alleging subject-matter jurisdiction under the alien tort statute. The
district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the statute
did not provide jurisdiction in cases involving a government's treat-
ment of its own nationals. 155
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It held as a threshold
matter that a violation of international law must "command the 'gen-
eral assent of civilized nations' to become binding on them all.
156
"Were this not so, the courts of one nation might feel free to impose
idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying inter-
national law."157 However, the court held "there are few, if any, issues
in international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as
the limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its cus-
tody. '"158 Using language which has since become a jurisdictional
litmus test for other courts, Judge Kaufman held that the prohibition
against torture is "clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction
between treatment of aliens and citizens."159 The view that a violation
of international law cannot occur when "the aggrieved parties are
nationals of the acting state" is thus "clearly out of tune with the
current usage and practice of international law [which] . . . confer[]
fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own govern-
ments. '"160 The court mentioned choice of law only briefly in dicta,
suggesting that Paraguayan law might be an appropriate rule of
decision. 161
155. 630 F.2d at 880.
156. Id. at 881 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
157. Id. at 881.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 884.
160. Id. at 884, 885.
161. Id. at 889. Judge Kaufman described the choice of law process as "primarily concerned
with fairness" id., and speculated that on remand "the district court may well decide that fairness
requires it to apply Paraguayan law to the instant case." Id. at 889 n.25. The court continued
its focus on Paraguayan law in a brief discussion of the act of state doctrine. While the issue
was not properly preserved on appeal, Judge Kaufman noted "in passing . . . that we doubt
whether action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of
Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized
as an act of state." Id. at 889. The opinion contains no discussion of how the Paraguayan
government might have "ratified" Pena-Irala's acts. Such a definition would have been usefiul,
for the facts suggest that Pena-Irala acted at least with implicit government approval. The
opinion notes that when Dr. Filartiga commenced a criminal action in Paraguay against Pena-
Irala, his Paraguayan lawyer "was arrested and brought to police headquarters where, shackled
to a wall, Pena-Irala threatened him with death. The attorney, it is alleged, has since been
disbarred without just cause." Id. at 878. This evidence would seem to suggest, at a minimum,
that the Paraguayan government was aware of Pena-Irala's actions and made no effort to punish
him. If this does nor rise to the level of "ratification" then one might construe Filartiga as
holding that nothing short of affirmative, public approval of Pena-Irala's acts would have been
so defined.
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On remand, 162 the district court employed a three-step choice of
law analysis. It first looked to international law, concluding that
remedies.for its violation were left to the laws of individual nations. 163
It then turned to U.S. law and found that "[bly enacting Section 1350
Congress entrusted that task [of enforcement of the law of nations] to
the federal courts and gave them power to choose and develop federal
remedies to effectuate the purposes of the international law incorpo-
rated into United States common law."' Yet, because United States
common law also includes principles of conflicts of law, the court
finally turned to the laws of Paraguay "to the extent they do not
inhibit the appropriate enforcement of the applicable international law
or conflict with the public policy of the United States. ' 165 Based on
this combination of international, U.S. and Paraguayan standards, the
court awarded the Filartigas $385,364 in compensatory damages and
$10 million in punitive damages. 166
Courts since Filartiga have generally affirmed the key elements of
the Second Circuit's holding: 167 that defendants in Section 1350 ac-
tions must be officials of a sovereign national government; 68 that the
alleged violation must be condemned by international community
consensus;169 and that the defendants must have violated those rights
162. Following the court of appeals' decision, Pena-Irala took no further part in the case and
a default was entered against him on the issue of liability. 577 F.Supp. at 861.
163. Id. at 863. The court gave no reason for first looking to international law.
164. Id. at 863.
165. Id. at 864.
166. Id. at 865, 867.
167. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to affirm or reject Filartiga in Amerada Hs
Shipping Co. v. Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. 428 (1989), but chose not to do so.
168. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 805-06 (Bork, J., concurring) (inter-
national law does not regulate the conduct of nonastate actors). But cf. Carmichael v. United
Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988) (assuming, without deciding, that
Alien Tort Statute confers subject matter jurisdiction "over private parties who conspire in, or
aid and abet, official acts of torture by one nation against the citizens of another nation.")
169. United States v. Covos, 872 F.2d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 1989) (stringent requirement that
a norm command general assent of nations); M.C. Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d
Cir. 1983) (alien tort statute "applies only to shockingly egregious violations of universally
recognized principles of international law"); Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc.,
722 F.Supp. 343, 348 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (no international consensus on government's duty to
warn individuals of imminent political violence); Forti I, 672 F.Supp. at 1539-40 (international
tort "must be one which is definable, obligatory (rather than hortatory), and universally con-
demned"); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F.Supp. 246, 258 (D.D.C.
1985), vacated and dismissed on other grounds, 736 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (doctrine of diplomatic
immunity well established in international law). Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 707 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) ("Forti I") contains an especially thorough discussion of the consensus requirement.
In Forti 1, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for "disappearance" and "cruel and inhuman
treatment" on the grounds that insufficient evidence had been presented of an international
consensus. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of this ruling, submitting "numerous legal
authorities" in support of their claim. 694 F.Supp. at 708. In Forti II, the court permitted the
plaintiff to assert a claim for disappearance, but reaffirmed its ruling on "cruel and inhuman
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in the course of their official duties. 170 As the court in Forti v. Suarez-
Mason concluded: "There appears to be a growing consensus that
§ 1350 provides a cause of action for certain international common
law torts.' 17' None of the post-Filartiga cases, however, discusses
choice of law under the statute,172 although all discuss the act of state
doctrine.
B. Applying an Integrated Conflicts Analysis to Alien Tort Claims
Assuming that a court had upheld jurisdiction for human rights
claims under the alien tort statute, it would turn next to act of state
issues. Under the integrated conflicts approach, the first issue for the
court would be whether Congress intended that a particular rule of
decision apply. No specific intention appears in the text of the statute,
although one might argue conjecturally that Congress hardly would
bother to make a breach of international law a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite if it intended that some other law govern the merits of the
claim. A systematic review of the statute's origins is necessary if the
"will of Congress" is to trump the many interests at play in the
integrated analysis.
1. The Statute in Historical Perspective
Because no legislative history of the First Judiciary Act survives,
and scholarly commentary until recently has been scant, 173 the specific
treatment" and held that the definitions of the right offered by the plaintiffs were too imprecise.
Id. at 711-12.
170. Forti 1, 672 FSupp. at 1546 ("a police chief who tortures, or orders to be tortured,
prisoners in his custody fulfills the requirement that his action be 'official' simply by virtue of
his position and the circumstances of the act").
171. Id. at 1539. The only exception to this trend is Judge Bork's concurring opinion in
Td-Oren, which argues that neither the alien tort statute nor international law provides individ-
uals with a cause of action. This opinion has been widely criticized by commentators and has
not, as of this writing, found support in any subsequent cases. Anthony D'Amato, What Does
Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985); Harvey, supra note 65; Enforcing Customary
International Law, supra note 154; Small, supra note 58; Virgina A. Melvin, Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 MINN. L. REv. 211 (1985); Wishnik,
supra note 65.
Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985), a case not premised on the alien
tort statute, agrees with Judge Bork that customary international law does not grant rights of
action to individuals. See also Linder v. Calero, 747 F.Supp. 1452 (S.D.Fla. 1990).
172. For scholarly comment on the choice of law issue, see Casto, supra note 148, at 473-
88 (1986); Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 97-102 (1981); Gordon A. Christiansen, The
Use of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39, 46-49
(1981). International choice of law issues in settings other than § 1350 are discussed in Daniel
C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of
International Choice of Law, 74 IowA L. REv. 165 (1988); Clyde H. Crockett, Choice of Law
Aspets of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1041 (1983).
173. Professor Goebel has attempted to reconstruct the Act's genesis by examining successive
drafts and certain letters written by its authors, principally those written by 'Oliver Ellsworth.
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origins of the alien tort statute are unclear. Judge Henry Friendly, in
an oft-quoted phrase, described the statute as "a kind of legal Loh-
engrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act...
no one seems to know from whence it came." 174 This sparse historical
record might be explained by the enactment since 1789 of numerous
federal laws which duplicate aspects of the alien tort statute. For
example, the statute is no longer the sole method by which aliens
may assert claims for violations of international law,175 nor is it the
only legislation whose scope is defined by reference to international
law. 176 For whatever reason, there has been a dearth of claims under
JULIUS GOEBEL, I HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECE3DENTS
ANtD BEGINNINGS THROUGH 1801 457-508 (1971). The draft provision which later became the
alien tort statute was originally produced by Ellsworth's committee, and apparently remained
unaltered throughout floor debate in the Congress. Id. at 494-508. The provision receives less
than a sentence's mention in Professor Goebel's lengthy treatment, id. at 473, and is not
mentioned at all in Professor Warren's classic account of the Act. Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 -ARv. L. REv. 49 (1923). Other works
generally regarded as authoritative are similarly silent. See, e.g., ERWIN SURRENCY, History of
the Federal Courts (1987); Paul Bator, Judiciary Act of 1789, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1075 (1986); FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927).
174. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015.
175. General federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 includes actions based
on federal common law, Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972); Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959), into which customary international law is
incorporated. The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 162 (1814); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199, 228 (1796); Talbot v. Johnson, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 161 (1795) (opinion of Iredell,
J.); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1795) (opinion of Jay, C.J.); Louis
HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 223 (1972) ("[i]ssues of international law
that arise in the state courts, then, are federal questions and can be appealed to the Supreme
Court; and the Supreme Court can determine and establish a single, uniform rule of customary
international law for state as well as federal courts"); Michael Glennon, Raising the Paquete
Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law hy the Executive Unconstitutional, 80 Nw. U.
L. REv. 321, 343-48 (1985) (discussing textual and historical bases for considering international
customary law as federal common law).
While the view of international customary norms as "arising under" federal law for jurisdic-
tional purposes is not without its critics, see Arthur Weisburd, The Executive Branch and Inter-
national Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1234-51 (1988); Handel, 601 F.Supp. at 1426-28, it
does have the support of the American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 111, reporters' note 4; the leading treatise on federal jurisdiction, 13B
CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3563 at 63 (2d ed. 1984); the United States Departments of Justice and State as amic curiae
in Filartiga, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 21 n.49, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 1.L.M. 585, 606 n.49 (1980); and at least one federal
district court, Forti 1, 616 F.Supp. at 1544.
176. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (statutory grant of jurisdiction to courts martial does not deprive such
courts of concurrent jurisdiction permitted by the law of war), see also Ex Pakte Quirn, 317
U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942); Madsden v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1952); 15 U.S.C. §§ 606(b)
(repealed 1947) and 713(b) (repealed 1945) (authorizing certain loans to foreign governments,
provided that "no such loans shall be made in violation of international law as interpreted by
the Department of State"); 18 U.S.C. § 112 (amended 1972) (criminalizing assaults on foreign
officials in violation of the law of nations); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (criminalizing piracy "as defined
by the law of nations"), see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 157-63
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the statute and a corresponding lack of judicial opinion on its scope
and content.
Recently, however, scholars have traced the statute's origins to its
drafters' desire that the new nation demonstrate its commitment to
abide by the law of nations.177 For the members of the First Congress
and their contemporaries, obedience to the law of nations was an
imperative of sovereignty, an affirmation that the United States had
taken a secure place in the community of nations. 178 As early as 1779
the Continental Congress had resolved that "the law of nations must
be strictly observed."179 The First Congress also understood, as Pro-
fessor D'Amato has observed, that transgressions of international law
which today might elicit no more than a diplomatic protest in those
(1820); 18 U.S.C. § 3058 (concerning enemy soldiers interned within the United States "in
accordance with the law of nations"); 22 U.S.C. § 1623(aX2) (Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission to evaluate claims according to "the applicable principles of international law,
justice and equity"); 22 U.S.C. § 1644b (claims of U.S. nationals against East Germany to be
determined by applicable substantive law, "including international law"); 22 U.S.C. § 1645b
(same provision, concerning claims against Vietnam); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (concerning
issuance of writ of habeas corpus where alien prisoner claims some right, privilege, or immunity
under the order of a foreign state, "the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of
nations"); 28 U.S.C. § 125 l(aX2) (Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over actions against
ambassadors and their servants which are "not inconsistent with the law of nations"); 50 U.S.C.
§ 1513(2) (restricting funds for testing of biological or chemical weapons if doing so would
"violate international law"); Act of Apr. 19, 1860, ch. 34, § 1, 12 Star. 838, 838-39 (referring
to law of nations as rule of decision in deciding land title claim), see also United States v.
Repentigny, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 211, 257-58 (1867); Act of June 15, 1917, Chap. 30, § 5, 40
Stat. 217, 221 (authorizing withholding of permission for certain ships to leave U.S. ports
where granting permission would compromise U.S. neutrality under law of nations). See generally
QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 179-87 (1922).
177. Most comprehensive are Burley, supra note 65, and Casto, supra note 148. Other sources
with useful historical discussions are Randall, supra note 153; Louis Henkin, International Law
as Law of the United States, 82 MICH. L. Rav. 1555 (1984); and Edwin Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 (1952).
178. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 23 (U.S. 1776) (new United States has
power to do all "Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do"); THE FEDERALIST
No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) C[i]t is of high importance to the peace
of America that she observe the laws of nations . . ."); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dail.)
419, 474 ("the United States . . . by taking a place among the nations of the earth (became)
amenable to the laws of nations"); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); JAMES WILSON, Of The Law of Nations (1790 - 1791), in THE
WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON (Bird Wilson ed., 1804), rerinted in I THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 153 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) ("tilt is of the highest, and,
in free states, it is of the most general importance, that the sacred obligation of the law of
nations should be accurately known and deeply felt."). Vattel, who greatly influenced the
thinking of early American policymakers, see DANIEL G. LANG, FOREIGN POUCY IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC 13-33 (1985); Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, 7 AM. POL. SCl. REV.
395 (1913), held that "nations inherited from nature 'the same obligations and rights' and that
a "small republic" was "no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom," quoted in
JOHN B. MOORE, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 131-32 (1905).
179. 14 J. CONT. CONG. 635 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1909) (1779), quoted in Henkin,
supra note 177, at 1557 n.8.
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days frequently led to declarations of war. 10 Thus, U.S. adherence to
the law of nations was both a sword and a shield: it affirmed the
country's sovereign character while it minimized provocations that
might lead to war.
From these general concerns, recent scholarship has developed three
theories which purport to explain the origins of the alien tort statute.
The data unearthed by Professors Casto and Burley is particularly
substantial, and it is not my intention to add to that research here.
Instead, a summary of each theory will demonstrate that regardless of
their differences, each assumes that the Framers intended for inter-
national law to serve as the rule of decision in actions under the
statute.
a. The "Denial of Justice" Theory18 1
i. The Historical Claim
The first approach may be referred to as the "denial of justice"
theory. It holds that the Framers of the First Judiciary Act, wary of
state courts' notorious bias against claims by aliens, sought to make
a "neutral" federal forum available to litigants. 8 2 Alexander Hamilton
warned in The Federalist No. 80 that state denial of justice to an alien
was "classed among the just causes of war."' 18 3 While the alienage and
diversity provisions of the Judiciary Act also permitted alien plaintiffs
180. Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 Amt. J.
INT'L L. 62, 64 (1988). The explanation for the sensitivity of nations to the illegal behavior of
others may lie in the highly pragmatic nature of international law in the 18th century. To a
much greater degree than today, rules of international law were an accurate reflection of
international reality. Stephen Peter Rosen, Alexander Hamilton and the Domestic Uses of International
Law, 5 DIPL. HisT. 183, 195-96 (1981). For example, American neutrality between France
and Britain in the 1790s was not only a recognition that siding with one would certainly mean
war with the other, but was also an attempt on the part of Alexander Hamilton, among others,
to fulfill an obligation of neutrality imposed by the law of nations. Lang, supra note 178, at
86-90, 100-01. President Washington went so far as to suspend a cabinet meeting in April
1793 so that members might consult Vattel and other legal authorities in order to marshall
their arguments for and against neutrality. Id. at 88.
181. These titles were coined by Professor Burley, supra note 65.
182. Burley, supra note 65, at 465-69; D'Amato, supra note 180; Casto, supra note 148, at
489-98; Randall, supra note 153 at 19-22; Scott A. Rosenberg, The Theory of ProtectiveJuris-
diction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 1018 (1982) [hereinafter ProtectiveJurisdiction].
183. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Vattel also held this view, and was perhaps the source for Hamilton's statement. EbIER DE
VATTEL, II THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. XVIII, § 350, at 230-31 (Carnegie ed. & Fenwick
trans., 1916) (orig. pub. 1758), quoted in D'Amato, supra note 180, at 64.
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to bring suit in federal court' 84-and, at least in theory, allowed them
to assert violations of the law of nations-the $500 amount-in-con-
troversy requirement all but precluded most tort actions. 8 5 Further-
more, the First Congress likely understood, as the Supreme Court held
in 1809,16 that the diversity clause did not permit suits between two
aliens, but permitted only suits between an alien and a citizen. 8 7
According to the "denial of justice" theory, the alien tort statute filled
this gap and brought to fruition Hamilton's belief that "the federal
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens
of other countries were concerned."' 88
ii. Implications for Choice of Law
The First Congress could hardly be certain that aliens would obtain
justice if federal courts hearing their claims applied the substantive
law of the various states in which they sat. Mere access to a federal
forum, without the assurance of a uniform rule of decision, would
mean that the federal system had assumed only partial control over
this sensitive class of cases. 189 Given a sovereign's right under the law
of nations to redress denials of justice, the First Congress surely
intended to demonstrate that justice in fact had been rendered under
that very same law.
One counterargument would suggest that if the Framers were con-
cerned solely with just results-that is, with ensuring injured aliens
prompt and adequate compensation-then actions based on state tort
law would serve just as well as those based on the law of nations.
Whether aliens suffered injury to person, property, or reputation, they
184. The circuit courts were given jurisdiction
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value
of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a
party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen
of another State.
1 Stat. ch. 20. § 11, 73 (1789).
185. Casto, supra note 148, at 497 (tort judgments in the late 18th century rarely exceeded
$500; while Oliver Ellsworth, principal drafter of the First Judiciary Act, was on the Connecticut
bench, the largest tort award was $333).
186. Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809).
187. Burley, supra note 65, at 474.
188. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
189. Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 182, at 1019 ("the Continental Congress feared that
remedies under state law were inadequate to redress violations of international law"), Cf. WA
W. CROSSKEY, I POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
646 (1953) (constitutional distribution of jurisdiction premised on view that "uniformity in
American judicial decisions under the law of nations where foreigners were concerned, and,
hence, control over the subject by the Supreme Court, were essential to the conduct of American
foreign relations").
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surely would receive adequate relief in actions at common law. The
force of this argument is in part a reflection of the "denial of justice"
theory's deficiencies. As the "duty" theory' 90 demonstrates, the Fram-
ers were not only concerned with awarding adequate compensation,
but were also eager to demonstrate the vitality of the law of nations
under the new constitution and organic judicial statutes. 191
The First Congress clearly understood how to grant aliens a federal
forum in which to try common law damage claims. Section 9 of the
Judiciary Act, for example, gave the district courts jurisdiction over
all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, and Section 13 granted the
Supreme Court jurisdiction over suits by and against ambassadors and
other public ministers. That Congress did not grant blanket jurisdic-
tion to alien plaintiffs (or even to aliens asserting tort claims), but
instead restricted Section 9(b) to cases involving violations of the law
of nations or treaties of the United States, suggests concern not only
for compensation per se but also for compensation according to the
substantive law mentioned in the statute. In John Jay's words, it was "of
high importance to the peace of America that she observe the law of
nations. "192
Under the "denial of justice" theory, therefore, the statute is seen
as having both procedural and substantive components, the former
providing a neutral forum for alien plaintiffs and the latter ensuring
that "Ithe 'law of nations' would serve as an impartial standard,
acceptable to all nations." 193 Mere compensation under state law would
not have fulfilled this second concern.
b. The "Ambassador Protection" Theory
i. The Historical Claim
The second theory posits that the statute was designed to protect
the rights and physical integrity of foreign ambassadors.1 94 It traces
the Framers' concerns both to Blackstone's listing of infringement of
ambassadorial rights as one of the three "principal offenses against the
law of nations," 195 and to the 1784 assault upon the French Consul
General, M. Marbois, by an itinerant French nobleman. 196 Although
190. See infra text accompanying notes 211-223.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 211-221.
192. THE FEDERALIST No.3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
193. DnAmato, supra note 180, at 66.
194. Burley, supra note 65, at 469-74.
195. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 881 (1769).
The other two offenses were violations of safe conducts and piracy. Id.
196. Casto, supra note 148, at 491-94; Randall, supra note 153, at 24-28.
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M. Marbois's assailant was prosecuted in the courts of Pennsylvania, 197
the incident provoked an outcry 198 and prompted the Continental
Congress to pass resolutions praising the prosecution and apologizing
to the French ambassador. 199 As a result, when the Constitutional
Convention convened in 1787, "the issue of compliance with the law
of nations was fresh on the minds of the delegates. 200 James Madison
warned the Convention that few state or national means existed to
prevent violations of the law of nations. 201 Edmond Randolph con-
curred: "If the rights of an ambassador be invaded by any citizen, it
is only in a few States that any laws exist to punish the offender.
20 2
The Convention addressed these concerns in a number of ways-for
example, by granting to Congress the authority to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations,2 0 3 and by vesting the Supreme
Court with original jurisdiction over all cases involving ambassadors
and other public ministers. 2°4 The "ambassador protection" theory
views the alien tort statute as a further response to the Marbois affair
and other similar incidents, since it provides civil remedies to ambas-
sadors for injuries they may suffer as a result of conduct deemed
criminal by the law of nations.
ii. The Implications for Choice of Law
The "ambassador protection" theory treats the statute as embodying
a guarantee that the full panoply of ambassadorial rights will be
respected and that damages will be awarded for their breach. While
such guarantees conceivably could have been assembled piecemeal
though various common law tort actions (assault, battery, trespass,
defamation, etc.), eighteenth-century lawyers understood the inter-
national rights and privileges of ambassadors to be more than the sum
of the protections offered by municipal law. Vattel observed that while
states were obligated to protect all aliens from harm, "this attention
is in a higher degree due to a foreign minister.'"205 Those who insulted
or injured foreign ministers could not be pardoned by the receiving
sovereign, as such acts constituted "a crime of State, an offense against
197. Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1784).
198. Casto, supra note 148, at 492 n. 143 (detailing correspondence among prominent
Americans decrying the assault and the resulting diplomatic fallout).
199. 27 J. Cont. Cong. 478-79 (1784); 28 J. Cont. Cong. 314-15 (1785).
200. Casto, supra note 148, at 493.
201. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 316 (1911),
cited in Casto, supra note 148, at 494.
202. Id.
203. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, c. 10.
204. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
205. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAw, bk.
IV, ch. VII, § 82, at 681 (Carnegie ed. & Fenwick trans., 1916) (orig. pub. 1758).
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the law of nations. ,206 Acts which were perfectly legal when directed
toward ordinary citizens, and which were not subject to sanctions
under municipal law, became illegal when committed against ambas-
sadors or members of their staffs. According to Balckstone, "all process
whereby the person of any ambassador, or of his domestic or domestic
servant, may be arrested, or his goods distreined or seised, shall be
utterly null and void," and those perpetrating such actions "shall be
deemed violarers of the laws of nations, and disturbers of the public
repose." 207 Such a heightened sensitivity was warranted, as Alexander
Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 8 1, where he wrote that "[p]ublic
ministers of every class are the immediate representatives of their
sovereigns. All questions in which they are concerned are ... directly
connected with the public peace. 208
Thus, an alien tort statute which functioned only to transfer com-
mon law damage actions from state to federal court hardly would have
reassured the French that M. Marbois would be accorded the full
protection of the law of nations while stationed in the United States.
In a letter to Jefferson regarding the Pennsylvania state court prose-
cution, James Monroe lamented that "all they [the French] have a
right to expect is that he [the assailant] be punished agreeably to the
laws of Pennsylvania .... 209 A parallel civil action, also based on
Pennsylvania law, would have been equally unacceptable. Perhaps
Monroe was surprised when the court convicted the assailant of having
committed "an atrocious violation of the law of nations" as incorpo-
rated into the common law of Pennsylvania. 210 Nevertheless, this
welcome result should not have changed Monroe's or the other Framers'
views on the need for a federal action which applied the law of nations.
Even if every state court were to follow Pennsylvania's example in
similar cases, the alien tort statute would serve little useful purpose
if it did not at least match the state courts by following the law of
nations as the rule of decision. It would have been an odd arrangement
indeed for state courts to be the ones enforcing the law of nations in
cases brought by foreign ambassadors, leaving the federal courts to
follow traditional common law rules in identical cases.
206. Id.
207. BLACKSTONE, srpra note 195, at 70-71.
208. THE FEDERAuST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
209. Letter fromJames Monroe to James Madison (Nov. 15, 1784), reprintedin 8 THE PAPERS
oF JAMFS MADISON 141 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal ed. 1973), quoted in
Casto, supra note 148, at 493 n. 146.
210. Respublica v. de Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 117.
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c. The "Duty to Apply International Law" Theory
i. The Historical Claim
The third approach, by far the most analytically sound, finds the
statute to be "a direct response to what the Founders understood to
be the nation's duty to propagate and enforce those international law
rules that directly regulated individual conduct. "211 Among the many
weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation was their inability to give
effect to the law of nations on a federal level or to compel states to
do so in their courts. 212 The Continental Congress expressed its frus-
tration in a 1781 resolution, issued three years prior to the Marbois
affair, which urged state legislatures to "provide expeditious, exem-
plary and adequate punishment" for a number of infractions "against
the law of nations." The resolution also exhorted the states to "au-
thorise suits to be instituted by the party injured." 21 3 Although the
states failed to respond, the First Judiciary Act implemented the
resolution's agenda in its entirety. The "duty" theory explains the alien
tort statute as fulfilling the resolution's call for civil remedies. 21 4
The genesis of the 1781 resolution, and its adoption eight years
later, lay in the twin concepts of "duty" and "honor." International
law itself imposed a duty on the United States to protect aliens within
its borders. 215 The Framers probably perceived this obligation as hav-
ing both a pragmatic component (foreign merchants, for example,
would be assured that the law of nations would govern their trade in
the new republic)2 16 and a moral one. The latter was derived from
Vattel's conception of international law as a variation upon the moral
law of nature applicable to individuals. 21 7 Jefferson echoed this theme
when he wrote that the moral duties of individuals in the state of
nature "accompany them into a state of society and the aggregate of
the duties of all the individuals composing the society constitutes the
duty of that society toward any other. 2 1 8 For the Framers, therefore,
211. Burley, supra note 65, at 475. See also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS 124 (rev. ed. 1954) ("the new commonwealth, inspired, under the
guidance of Benjamin Franklin, by ideas of cosmopolitan liberalism, exhibited from the begin-
ning a particular propensity for international law.")
212. Casto, supra note 148, at 490.
213. 21J. CONT. CONG. 1136-37 (1781), quoted in Burley, supra note 65, at 476.
214. Id. at 477.
215. VATTEL, supra note 205, bk. H, ch. VI, § 72, at 136.
216. Burley, supra note 65, at 481.
217. Vattel did not view international law which derived from positive agreements between
nations as part of the moral law of nature. See LANG, supra note 178, at 23-25.
218. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the French Treaties, 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 219-20 (P. Ford ed. 1895), quoted in Burley, supra note 65, at 484.
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the law of nations represented a combination of self-interest and moral
imperative, which created an acute sense of national obligation to act
in conformity with international norms.
Yet, for the Framers, adherence to the law of nations was not only
an obligation; it was also an indelible badge of statehood. 219 Many
statesmen of the period wrote of the U.S. commitment to the rule of
law between nations in the same ringing tones in which they pro-
claimed their commitment to domestic constitutionalism.220 Chief
Justice John Jay summarized this sense of honor in a 1783 grand jury
charge:
As to the law of nations-they are those laws by which nations
are bound to regulate their conduct towards each other, both in
war and peace. Providence has been pleased to place the United
States among the nations of the earth, and therefore, all those
duties, as well as rights, which sprang from the relation of nation
to nation, have devolved upon us. 221
ii. Implications for Choice of Law
While the link between these sentiments and the meaning of the
alien tort statute can only be inferential, it is by no means tenuous.
*James Wilson stated in one of his Lectures on Law that "[t]o every
citizen of the United States, this law [of nations] is not only a rule of
conduct but may be a rule of decision." 222 The "duty" theory would
explain very little about the statute if actions thereunder were not a
concrete manifestation of the desire to implement and act upon rules
of international law. The Constitution already had permitted Congress
219. In 1779 the Continental Congress passed a resolution asserting that "the power of
executing the law of nations is essential to the sovereign supreme power of war and peace." 13
J. CONT. CONG 283 (1779).
220. See sources quoted in Burley, supra note 65, at 483. A representative statement is that
of James Wilson, who later became a Supreme Court Justice, in his 1791 Lectures on Law.
Speaking of whether American courts should follow the British example of applying the law of
nations, Wilson wrote:
If a similar conduct ought to be observed by those tribunals; what an immense improvement
has taken place in the application and administration of the law of nations! Hitherto that
great law has been applied and administered by the force or by the pleasure of the parties
in controversy: in the United States it can now be applied and administered by impartial,
independent, and efficient, though peaceful authority.
This deduction, if properly founded, places the government of the United States in an
aspect, new, indeed, but very conspicuous. It is vested with the exalted power of admin-
istering judicially the law of nations, which we have formerly seen to be the law of
sovereigns.
WILSON, supra note 178, vol. I at 282.
221. Trial of Gideon Henfield (C.C.D. Pa. 1783), reprinted in FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE
TRIALS 49, 52-53 (1849), quoted in Burley, rupra note 65, at 483.
222. WILSON, supra note 178, vol. I, at 282.
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to define and punish criminal acts in violation of the law of nations.
In such prosecutions, the law of nations, as the substantive basis for
the offense, clearly would serve as the rule of decision. 223 If the alien
tort statute is seen as representing a commitment to that law above
and beyond the imposition of criminal sanctions-which in itself is a
substantial affirmation of national purpose-then the statute could not
have been intended to accomplish less than do criminal prosecutions.
The "duty" theory remains coherent only if the alien tort statute
provides restitution to victims of international crimes based on the
same rules of decision used to prosecute the criminals themselves.
2. Giving Effect to Congressional Intent
In sum, each of the three prevailing theories purporting to explain
the origins of the alien tort statute requires that international law
serve as the rule of decision. This does not mean that the nature of
the plaintiff's remedy is also dictated by international norms; that
determination will come later. We are concerned here only with the
law imposing liability, since that is the law addressed by the act of
state doctrine. A federal court conducting a common law choice of
law analysis must give effect to this expression of congressional intent.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, courts and commentators have referred repeatedly
to the confused state of the law surrounding the alien tort statute and
act of state doctrine.22 4 The intersection of the two only magnifies the
problem. Kirkpatrick instructs courts that the act of state doctrine is
a special choice of law rule, but this makes sense only with reference
to outmoded conflicts rules rejected'long ago by most jurisdictions.
Upon further investigation, courts find that even when they use a lex
loci approach, they must assume that act of state embodies policies of
the Executive Branch which directly contradict the forum (and thus
also executive) policies used in the so-called "escape hatch." The
contradictions proliferate upon resort to the two most common excep-
223. E.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820) (upholding right of
Congress to define piracy in accordance with the law of nations, and affirming defendant's
conviction under that definition).
224. E.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("This case deals with an
area of the law that cries out for clarification by the Supreme Court. We confront at every turn
broad and novel questions about the definition and application of the 'law of nations."'); Bazyler,
supra note 76, at 329 ("the decisions of these courts [concerning act of state doctrine] have
created considerable confusion about the doctrine, and the confusion seems to be getting worse
with each successive court opinion"); Dellapenna, supra note 47, at 276 ("[w]ith near judicial
anarchy at the top, lower court decisions can be cited in support of each [act of state] theory
found in the increasingly confused Supreme Court decisions").
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tions to the doctrine. If courts turn instead to a modern conflicts
theory, they find that act of state either duplicates entirely the forum
policy component of the initial analysis, or, if it is folded into the
initial analysis, retains no independent existence or meaning.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, courts will find no case law
discussion of the role the alien tort statute should play in an act of
state analysis. In order to sustain jurisdiction, a court must find a
consensus in the international community, joined by the United States,
that certain human rights norms are binding law. Current act of state
theory finds no place for this profound expression of forum policy-
save as an "exception" which wholly ignores the separation of powers
concerns supposedly justifying its existence. Courts also offered no
reason why this policy cannot take its logical place either as the "escape
hatch" in a lex loci analysis or as an element of a modern conflicts
theory.
The goal of this article is to bring a measure of coherence and
clarity to this tangled web. By performing an integrated conflicts
analysis, courts can consider all the policies and interests that appear
at various stages in the current approach without undertaking the
impossible task of untangling the mechanical structures in which those
policies are now embedded. In alien tort actions, the integrated ap-
proach takes as its touchstone the historical fact that the Framers of
the First Judiciary Act enacted the statute to demonstrate their com-
mitment to therule of law among nations. In doing so, they assumed
that that same law would serve as the rule of decision in actions under
the statute.
If this wholesale rejection of the act of state doctrine seems either
too bold or simply unwarranted, it may be useful to recall that the
doctrine's origins lie as much in substantive international law as in
the demarcation of domestic spheres of power. Underhill, the first act
of state decision, is permeated with the positivism which underlay
international law in the late nineteenth century. Though international
law was not itself at issue in the case, 225 the Supreme Court would
have committed a grave breach of international comity if it had
permitted plaintiff Underhill to recover. Sabbatino refocused the act of
state doctrine on domestic issues, but retained Underhill's link to
international law by asserting the consensus exception. Justice Harlan
held that if an international rule were settled and noncontroversial,
then a claim under that rule would be "meet for adjudication by
225. The plaintiff's claim in Underhill involved routine intentional torts under state or federal
common law and did not implicate a violation of international law. The Underhill court stated,
however, that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment" on the acts of other sovereigns,
thereby implying that it would have dismissed the claim on act of state grounds if a clear
violation of international law were at issue.
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domestic tribunals. ' 226 The difference in the two rulings can be ex-
plained by changes in international law itself, which no longer shielded
government officials from all liability in the courts of other nations.
After Sabbatino the law continued to evolve, and it now recognizes
specific limitations on states' conduct toward their own citizens.
An alien tort action, which takes as its premise a well-established
international rule, is the perfect vehicle with which to recapture the
act of state doctrine's original symbiosis with international law. Much
of the confusion surrounding the doctrine arises from the courts' failure
to recognize its link to the substance of international law, and to allow
the doctrine to evolve in tandem with that law. The consensus excep-
tion does this to a degree, but its failure to explain its relation to
prior tiers of analysis and its incompatibility with modern conflicts
rules make it disturbingly result-oriented. An integrated conflicts
analysis, by contrast, permits courts to focus directly on international
law and its status in the United States through the use of a widely
accepted conflicts theory. In this way it remains true to Underhill's
general solicitude toward international law, but it is able to discard
the particular brand of international law, i.e., nineteenth-century pos-
itivism, that shaped that decision's approach to choice of law. Just as
Filartiga ushered human rights law onto the jurisdictional stage of
alien tort cases, an integrated approach applies that law to the merits
of the action.
226. 376 U.S. at 429 n.26.
